Map of Central Celebes, ca. 1912.
N. Adriani and Alb. C. Kruyt, *De Bare’e sprekenende Toradjas van Midden Celebes* [De Bare’e-speaking Toradjas from Central Celebes] (Second edition, Amsterdam 1951).
Creating Central Sulawesi

Mission Intervention, Colonialism and ‘Multiculturality’

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Central Sulawesi provides an example of how, under colonialism, non-state bodies contributed to the creation of new political identities in the Indonesian archipelago, and how the modern Indonesian state came to be based on these. Arguably, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the region was poised to be incorporated into the structure of one or other of the existing powerful Central and Southern Sulawesi political entities. As such, as just another ‘region’ in the sprawling archipelagic colony subjected to standard colonial policy, it should have been readily incorporated into the Indonesian state, albeit through the ‘Sulawesi Permesta’. Instead, in seeking to establish what one writer has described as a ‘volkskerk’ [people’s church], the ‘Poso mission’ established with colonial support by the Nederlandsche Zendingsgenootschap [Netherlands Missionary Society] in 1892, was instrumental in defining new religious, cultural and linguistic boundaries. These acted to effectively isolate the Pamona people from adjacent Christian communities established by other missionary endeavours; from their Islamic neighbours and, arguably, from the ‘nation’. As elsewhere in the archipelago, the subsequent process of this region’s reintegration has formed part of the difficult postcolonial legacy inherited by the Indonesian nation.

Introduction

By the end of the colonial era, Dutch and foreign missionary zeal had produced a patchwork of embryonic Christian communities across the Indonesian archipelago. The majority dated from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, although some – notably in Maluku and Nusa Tenggara – dated back to the days of the ‘spice trade’. The ‘modern’ mission reflected the nineteenth century religious revival in the Netherlands, but equally the ‘revival’ of Dutch imperial ambition to extend and bolster Dutch influence in the archipelago. Modern missionary endeavour thus became crucially intertwined with imperial policy, if not always completely in agreement with colonial policy on the ground. Largely co-opted by the colonial administration in the implementation of its twentieth century mission civilisatrice, the modern
‘ethno-missiology’\textsuperscript{5} approach of twentieth century missionaries amplified the delineation of ethnic identity across the system of ‘native states’ of the archipelago beyond Java.

While the ‘divide and rule’ nature of colonial policy and practice has become a truism, and Benedict Anderson’s dictum of ‘census, map and museum’ has been widely recognised as the defining analysis of the impact of the colonial state, much less has been said about the role of non-state actors, such as missionary endeavour, in underscoring this process of separation and definition. The consequences of the creation of modern cultural boundaries which colonial policy did not invent but defined, and which mission policy augmented and amplified, continued to play out in post-colonial Indonesia, not least as evidenced in the violence in Eastern Indonesia that accompanied the end of the Suharto era.

Like the other major islands of the Indonesian archipelago, the island of Sulawesi was never constituted as a single ethnic group. Henley describes ‘the human world of Celebes’ as

\begin{quote}
characterised in most respects by massive fragmentation [...] with [...] \textsuperscript{6} distinct languages known in 1981 to be spoken on the island [...] upon which is superimposed an exogenous diversity resulting from differential exposure to widely varying external influences.\textsuperscript{6}
\end{quote}

With its own distinct linguistic and cultural forms and traditionally occupying the upland regions of the Poso River and its tributaries – an area roughly convergent with the present Kabupaten Poso – the Pamona people first came into regular contact with Europeans in the 1890s. Originally referred to in Dutch sources as ‘Alfurs’ and later ‘Toraja’, early ethnographic studies soon identified the Pamona as an ethnically distinct people who, in their common

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} This article originates in a paper to a symposium arranged by the Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis (Institute for the History of the Netherlands (ING)) entitled: ‘Multiculturality, Religion and Legal Status in the Dutch Colonial World c. 1600-1960’, The Hague, 21-23 January 2009. My thanks to ING Programme Director ‘The Netherlands and Cultures Overseas’, Dr Gerrit Knaap, and two anonymous reviewers for development into its present form, ultimate responsibility for which is of course mine.
\item \textsuperscript{3} J. Rauwes, ‘The Growth of Societies in Holland’, in J. Rauwes et al., \textit{The Netherlands Indies} (London 1935) 56-75.
\item \textsuperscript{4} M. Kuitenbrouwer, \textit{Nederland en de opkomst van het moderne imperialisme. Koloniën en buitenlandse politiek, 1870-1922} (Amsterdam 1985).
\item \textsuperscript{5} This new approach was celebrated at the seminal world mission conference in 1910. W.H.T. Gairdner, \textit{Edinburgh 1910: An Account and Interpretation of the World Missionary Conference} (Edinburgh 1910).
\item \textsuperscript{6} D. Henley, \textit{The Idea of Celebes in History} (Clayton 1989) 2.
\end{itemize}
language (originally designated as *bare’e* and now known as *bahasa Pamona*), rituals and oral traditions distinguished themselves from their immediate neighbours, the mountain peoples to the west – To Napu, To Bada and To Besoa – and their south-eastern neighbours – To Mori, To Wana – and from the people now identified as ‘Toraja’, in south-western Sulawesi. The Pamona people, estimated to have numbered about 30,000 at the beginning of the twentieth century, lived in scattered hilltop villages throughout the Poso and Laa river basin, relatively isolated from neighbouring polities. Mountain ranges bounding their territory to the south minimized intervention from their titular overlord, the Datu of Luwu, but to the north the shores of Tomini Bay had already been colonised by several trading centres allied to Islamic states elsewhere in Sulawesi. To the west, the small state of Sigi – one of many ‘allies’ of the Dutch Crown – was reported to be beginning to assert its influence.

While divided into distinct clans, the four largest being Lage, Pebato, Wingke mPondoli (Wingkendano) and Onda’e, the Pamona recognised a common ancestry symbolised by the ‘stones of separation’: a set of monoliths near the northern shores of Lake Poso believed to represent the original seven sibling ancestors from which the Pamona clans descended. Diverse social and cultural traditions were apparent amongst these groups: there were slave-owning and non-slave owning clans; petty conflicts erupted between groups occasioning scalping and slavery; they recognised different obligations to a traditional overlord, the ruler of the southern Islamic state of Luwu. Mission accounts suggest that, by the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Pamona were being gradually drawn into the political and economic trajectories of their surrounding world – in the first place through increasing trade activity conducted from a number of Buginese and Chinese trading posts along the Tomini Bay coastline. Petty Islamic states in the north, re-energized by expanding world trade, such as Sigi, Parigi and Tojo, and Mandar in the southwest, were expanding their influence into inland Sulawesi. At the same time the Pamona, welcoming the trading opportunities their domination of the rich forests of the interior allowed them to monopolize, were gradually becoming integrated into an expanding regional trading economy.

Portrait of missionary Dr. A.C. Kruyt with his family in the garden, Dutch East Indies, dated 1920-1938. Tropenmuseum, Amsterdam.
It was at this moment, in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, that the colonial state began to intervene. Regional colonial administrators were concerned to take control of an expanding regional economy, although it was almost another twenty years before more than a token colonial presence was established in the Gulf of Tomini. It could be argued then that, at the end of the nineteenth century, Pamona society stood on the cusp of several potential futures. One of these futures, were it not for colonial intervention, would have been absorption into one or more of the Islamic states mentioned above that were expanding in the latter half of the nineteenth century, which were believed to be under the patronage of Buginese princes and the more substantial Luwu and Mandar states which held traditional claims over Central Sulawesi. An alternative trajectory could have resulted from being incorporated into an island-wide colonial administrative structure. The missionary presence in the heartland of Sulawesi Island ensured that both of these trajectories were effectively cut off.

The Poso mission

An examination of the case of Central Sulawesi as an example of the influence of missionary endeavour in shaping discrete modern Indonesian cultural ideates centres on an understanding of the specific activities of the leader of the Poso mission, Albert Kruyt. It was his particular emphasis on an ethnographic approach to the process of conversion, his long period of leadership, and not least his active participation in the political processes of the colonial state at local level that place him at the centre of Pamona’s political history.

Albert Christiaan Kruyt (1869-1949) was the son of a successful missionary in Java. Kruyt led the Christian mission amongst the Pamona people of Central Sulawesi for forty years, from 1891 to 1932, interrupted only by several periods of furlough and research; his son went on to lead the mission until 1954. The influence of this extended period of dedicated activity was reinforced by his extraordinary output of publications – 36 monographs and collections and close to 300 published articles, mainly on ethnographical...
and anthropological subjects. He spent his retirement (from 1932 to his death in 1949) educating later generations of Dutch missionaries, engaging in Dutch anthropological discourse, and rationalising his approach to and his solutions for accommodating the conflicting demands of colonialism and missions, continued even in posthumous publications. This assured him of an immense influence in mission – as well as in political and academic – circles in the colony, in the metropolitan Netherlands, and beyond.

Kruyt was a Christian socialist and, in historical terms within Dutch theology, an adherent of ‘ethical theology’. Within a decade of commencing his work, he came to be recognised as one of the ‘stand-out’ missionaries in the Dutch East Indies, both ‘at home’ and internationally. He articulated a clear claim for the superiority of Christian civilisation but, just as explicitly, rejected the materialism of the West. He saw Christianity as the highest evolutionary stage in human development. Kruyt’s ‘ethical theology’ held that becoming a Christian was an ‘evolutionary’ process which was manifested both materially and spiritually. This appeared to fit well with contemporary progressive colonial notions of a ‘civilising mission’, since Kruyt further held that this ‘Christian spirit’ was to be found, organically as it were, within a community at large, as an expression of its deeper spirituality. This view entailed several practical consequences. Firstly, Kruyt believed in the possibility of transforming the spiritual character of a ‘heathen community’ without fundamentally transforming their cultural life. Secondly, he was reluctant to prematurely, as he saw it, induce conversion or to impose a formal and externally predetermined church structure and liturgy on an emerging community which he believed should emerge from the embryonic Christian community itself. In this way, Kruyt infuriated ‘progressive’ colonial administrators and set him at odds with other ‘modern’ missionaries. At the same time, he upset traditional church and mission communities for failing, in their view, to produce a viable Christian church community. (Kruyt’s first baptism did not occur until 1910, more than fifteen years after he began his mission.) On the other hand, his early adoption of an ‘ethnographic missiology’ – a mission emphasis on the importance of understanding

10 For a complete bibliography of Kruyt’s publication output see G. Noort, De weg van magie tot geloof (Zoetermeer 2006) 543-560.
11 This was officially recognised at the world missionary conference in Edinburgh held in 1910 to which Kruyt was invited but unable to attend. Gairdner, Edinburgh 1910.
13 Discussed by A.C. Kruyt in Van Heiden tot Christen (Oegstgeest 1926).
a ‘primitive society’ to find a way to be able to develop the individual’s relationship to (a Christian) God – defined him as a leader in twentieth-century mission practice.\textsuperscript{14} It was his direct interaction with the Pamona people (‘these people of nature’ who he said ‘provided me with such new insights about the thought processes of primitive peoples’) that convinced him of the significance of ethnological and linguistic research for ‘missionary work’.\textsuperscript{15}

Developed as a foundation for his missionary work, Kruyt’s use of ethnography placed him at the cutting edge not just of missionary activity and discourse in his day, but of anthropological discourse at the beginning of the century. Although his account of spiritualism is now thoroughly discredited\textsuperscript{16}, Kruyt significantly added to – and to some extent overturned – existing academic assumptions about archipelagic peoples espoused by the leading expert of the day, Leiden Professor Wilken, whose work was widely recognised by prominent Anglophone leaders in the field.\textsuperscript{17} The scientific world, while questioning his lack of training and emphasis on spiritualism, generally welcomed his prodigious ethnographic output.

Against criticisms from the colonial administration that he was retarding modernisation, Kruyt countered that his aim was to protect the cultural framework of Pamona society from the ravages of modernity introduced by colonialism as, in his view, already evident in the Minahassa. Recognizing the importance of material development, he nevertheless believed this would (and should) follow spiritual development, and that replacing the spiritual foundations of this Animist society with a belief in Christianity would in time also improve its physical well-being. Material development without an appropriate spiritual substructure would prove fatal, while imposing an ecclesiastical order rather than allowing this to evolve from the people themselves, similarly, could not provide a sound basis for a future church. It was essential that education occur in the Pamona language; that as soon as practical, this be undertaken by locally trained Pamona teachers, and that Pamona children use texts based on their own traditional oral literature.\textsuperscript{18} Attempts to introduce other aspects of ‘modern development’, such as extended medical facilities or shops or commercial activity, were specifically suppressed by Kruyt within the territory of the mission.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{14} Noort, De weg van magie tot geloof, 213.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibidem, 212.
\textsuperscript{16} R.E. Downs, The Religion of the Bare’e Speaking Torajas of Central Celebes (The Hague 1956).
\textsuperscript{18} In this regard, linguist Dr Nicolaus Adriani played a vital role in transcribing Pamona oral literature, which was then incorporated into mission school readers.
\textsuperscript{19} W.J.L. Dake, Het medische werk van de Zending in Nederlands-Indië (Kampen 1972) 139-171.
Gedeelte van een hoofddoek (Siga). To Wingke mPono.

Een gedeelte van een hoofddoek (Siga). To Pehato.

Vrouwenbadje (Lemba, karaba) To Poeoe mBoto.

Sirh-zak (Watoertoe) To Bada.

Gedeelte van een Sarong (Plooeva) To Napoe.

BLAD VIII. HOOFDSTUK XXI „NIJVERHEID“ (I. FOEJA-BEREIDING).
BESCHILDERDE FOEJA-KLEEDINGSTUKKEN.
In his theological views, he gained the somewhat ambiguous support of the leading Dutch Protestant missiologist, Hendrik Kraemer. Kraemer argued against those who saw missionaries as agents of cultural destruction. He believed that colonialism had already irretrievably shattered the cultural integrity of indigenous societies, such as in Bali and Sumatra, and that therefore the work of missionaries played an essential and humanitarian role in filling the cultural void colonial modernity had produced. He also questioned traditional mission policies, suggesting in a series of reports on established mission fields in the 1930s that he doubted that any of these emerging indigenous Christian communities were yet ready to form independent churches, arguing instead that the production of ‘real Christians’ needed time. Implicitly at least, however, he was also critical of Kruyt’s ‘naïve’ belief in the power of the ‘Word’, arguing for a more forceful ‘assault’ on the consciousness of the individual prospective convert, since the fundamental characteristics of Animism were ‘largely a cover for the desires and egotism of man, who tries to assert himself with his helplessness and craftiness, with his vitality and his naïve self-preservation’.

Mission and state in the colonisation of ‘Tana Pamona’

Central Sulawesi had come under effective colonial control in the wake of the 1905-1907 military campaign on the island. The arrival of the Dutch colonial administration in Central Sulawesi reflected a marked shift to a new, more self-assured imperial policy, generally known as the ‘ethical policy’. This called for the modernisation of the colonial state, the development of its economic and human potential and acceptance of a moral responsibility to ensure the immediate and longer-term welfare of its inhabitants. These aims were premised on the ability to establish a secure state. The engagement of missionaries was regarded, at least initially, as a key component of the post-military phase of accommodating people to the new demands of colonialism (and in the case of Poso, as a preliminary to colonial administration), specifically in the more ‘primitive’ areas of the archipelago.

References


communities in the Netherlands saw themselves as having a role to play in fulfilling the nation’s expanding imperial responsibility and, more prosaically, having a responsibility to stamp their mark on the Christian face of Dutch colonialism.  

The Poso mission was directly involved in advising on military strategies and the creation of the territorial and political entity that became the new kingdom of Poso, and the subsequent reorganisation of Pamona society. In the initial decade of colonial rule, local colonial administrators resorted to the use of ‘zachte dwang’ [‘gentle coercion’], as well as an overt show of military force to overcome widespread active and passive resistance to the radical changes being implemented. Small villages were forcefully relocated from their traditional defensive hilltop positions and amalgamated into large complexes accessibly situated alongside proposed new roads and new, extensive village rice fields. The forcible imposition of new methods of growing sawah rice, the prohibition of extended expeditions to gather valuable forest products for trade on the coast, compulsory labour on road construction and construction of single family housing meant that the new regime was dramatically affecting all aspects of traditional life.  

The resultant confusion and disorientation, as well as the physical relocation and amalgamation caused a significant rise in mortality due to a combination of the spread of malarial, tubercular, cholera and other infections and ‘spiritual depression’. Unsettled conditions, as well as disease, are also believed to have contributed to the high rate of infant mortality.  

It is in this context that the Poso mission gained a privileged and influential position. On the one hand, the decades of experience Kruyt had accumulated prior to this invasion by the colonial state enabled him to take on the role of adviser to local colonial officials. He was thus able to advise them on the definition of the boundaries of clan-based territorial districts, on the appointment of Pamona to administrative positions in the newly created colonial ‘native state’, and on the definition of borders restraining the traditional claimants to Pamona allegiance on the part of Luwu and Mandar, and the more recent aspirations of the smaller northern Tomini states. In ‘exchange’, as it were, Kruyt gained state support for the mission aims in terms of the suppression of a number of ‘heathen practices’ which both Christian missionary and Christian state considered inhuman and uncivilized and as undermining ‘rust en orde’ [‘peace and order’]. This included the religio-cultural practices of scalp-hunting, double funerals and slavery, but also the institutional bases of Pamona traditional religious practices, the buildings –

23 Brouwer, Dr Alb. Kruyt, 7-10.  
‘lobo’ – and the female priesthood, upon which village religion was based.\(^{26}\) The rituals associated with the cycles of traditional agriculture that had been central to religious practice now also gradually declined as a result of the imposition of sawah, and were progressively replaced by Christian versions such as harvest thanksgiving. Most importantly in meeting the mutual objectives of church and state, colonial authorities were initially happy to support (through *zachte dwang*) school attendance and devoted substantial local funding to support mission schools.

On the other hand, the mission played a crucial role as an intermediary between the people and the colonial administration, establishing itself as an independent advisor to the Pamona, initially with those Panoma leaders with whom it had previously established relations, but increasingly ever more widely. Kruyt and his fellow missionaires were able to advise on the construction and function of family houses; could advise newly appointed village leaders about marshalling the required road construction work parties for compulsory *herendiensien* [unpaid labour on public projects] imposed as part-payment of new taxes. Through the gradual development of a team of indigenous teachers, or gurus, who villagers had to support, the mission provided local communities with its ‘modern advisers’, and through its mission schools (which they were required to build and maintain), its children were provided with ‘the new knowledge’ that helped make sense of the new age.

Despite differences in motivation and orientation, and the growing disagreement between mission and local administration, which began to unsettle what was initially a mutually beneficial relationship, mission activity in fact contributed to the broader colonial objective of systematising colonial administration across the archipelago. Central Sulawesi was being integrated into an archipelago-wide blueprint of ‘self-rule’ states developed during the reign of Governor General J.B. van Heutsz by his one-time adjutant, Hendrikus Colijn.\(^{27}\) The sudden expansion of the colonial state was only possible by the refinement of the practice of a system of indirect rule which developed over time to formalize colonial alliances with ‘autonomous’ archipelagic states. In the twentieth century, the traditional contractual declaration or ‘*Lange Verklaring*’ [extended declaration], now actively enforced by the concerted exercise of military power, was reduced to a purposefully vague, abbreviated contractual instrument with self-governing ‘native states’ known as the ‘*Korte Verklaring*’ [abbreviated declaration].\(^{28}\)

\(^{26}\) Adriani and Kruyt, *De bare’e sprekeende Toradjas*, volume 1 (Chapter 12) 361-393.


\(^{28}\) J.M. Somer, *De Korte Verklaring* (Breda 1934).
however, this required the existence of existing, or ‘ready-made,’ viable ‘native states’. Both the legitimacy of colonial rule and, more generally the economic viability of the colonial administration were based on the manufacture of a ‘multi-polity’: the creation of a set of distinct, technically autonomous but subservient political entities. This system of ‘zelfbesturende landschappen’ [self-governing regions] in the Outer Islands, as further entrenched in law in legislation of 1919 and 1927, regulated the powers (and responsibilities) of native states and their relationship to the colonial centre.

Even though a ‘Korte Verklaring’ had been signed with several Pamona clan leaders in Poso in 1891, Tana Pamona did not constitute a ‘state’, let alone an effective political entity. For Central Sulawesi, as for much of the Outer Islands, this process of administrative definition involved a complex process of the detailing of local boundaries, defining local ‘governments’ with whom such contracts could be drawn up and enforced. In laying out a blue print for Poso, it is clear that the overarching objective of the new colonial administrative policy was to establish an ordered territory to fund and facilitate the overall colonial policy of economic development. The size of the proposed administrative unit for Poso was defined in terms of a population sufficient to generate an income capable of funding its development and on-going administration and contribute to the central treasury. A native government hierarchy had to be formally established by the appointment of (initially) five autonomous rulers or ‘Mokole Bangke’, for each of the five (out of fifteen) recognized major clans. Again, as for other ‘native states’, this indigenous structure was to be supervised by a European administration and, over time, by a number of ‘native officials’ appointed by the respective colonial departments to implement colonially devised policies such as road construction, agriculture, health and (although not in the case of this mission precinct) education. The key figure in this European administration was the controleur, whose role, particularly in those regions of the archipelago where ‘ontwikkelde districtshoofden’ [educated or competent native leaders] were lacking, was ‘to endeavour to provide good leadership [...] and to be of benefit to the native population’ in particular by paying attention to their economic circumstances and ‘their susceptibility to development and education’.

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30 In Java, a system of *gemeenten* [communities] and *landraden* [provincial assemblies] and municipal councils in urban areas was established, with limited indigenous representation.


In practice, this ‘leadership’ was achieved under significant duress and, underpinning the definition of such ‘zelfbesturende landschappen’ – as Colijn’s calculations of the economic requirements for the new state of Poso clearly reveal – was a primary aim to define an economic baseline from which to ensure regional ‘self-sufficiency’. Each landschap was to be responsible for maintaining its own landschapskas or local treasury, from which its own development and its contribution to the central colonial treasury were to be funded. Only in this way would it be possible to finance the administration of such a far-flung colonial state.  

This basic political structure was further entrenched by two apparently contradictory discursive colonial practices involving the question of ‘adatrecht’ [customary law] and the idea of an ‘eenheidsstaat’ [unitary state]. The implications of these discourses, both far from being settled by the end of the colonial era, arguably underpin the history of the idea of ‘a legal plurality’ encompassed in the concept of ‘unity in diversity’.  

The essence of the ‘adatrecht’ debate can be loosely described as being conducted between ‘separators’: those who saw the definition of adatrecht as defining and protecting cultural specificity, and ‘equalisers’: those who saw the promulgation of adatrecht as denying the ultimate development of the equal status of indigenous societies, whether as between ethnic groups themselves or between colonizer and colonized. The most sympathetic interpretation of the policy has been that it was an attempt to place racial groups across the colonial territory on an equitable ‘equal-but-different’ footing and that colonial intervention was intended to ‘protect’ and aid the development of the weak in the interests of greater equity or even survival, by more powerful groups. Full implementation of such a policy failed because of pragmatic concerns that this would require the complete overhaul of the colonial administration, which was financially impossible.


37 Fasseur, ‘Colonial Dilemma’, 54.
At the same time, there were other strands of European discourse evolving in the twentieth century that nevertheless affirmed the goal of a unitary state as a positive ideal. These ranged from the pragmatic self-interest of a settler community, as notably voiced by the Indisch Partij [Indies Party],

38 to the more utopian ideals of a multi-ethnic state.

39 Amongst the more romantically-tinged notions of a ‘Tropisch Nederland’ [Tropical Netherlands], an ‘Insulinde’ or a ‘Nusantara’, was also the more political concept of ‘association’ most clearly articulated by the Islam scholar, Snouck Hurgronje (1911) and later idealists, such as the colonial bureaucrat De Kat Angelino (1929-1931). The former envisaged the possibility of the association of Mohammedan subjects of the Dutch state with the Dutch people [...] [to develop] sufficient unity of culture between the subjects of the Queen of the Netherlands on the shores of the North Sea and those of Insulinde.

40 The latter, writing at the height of the nationalist movement, imagined the possibility of an ‘eenheidsstaat’ [unitary state] constructed from the successful fusion of its many ethnic groups. De Kat imagined that ‘many religions, many small local patriotism, many economic standards can be accommodated in an eenheidsstaat.’

41 Like Snouck Hurgronje, De Kat argued that greater intellectual development would be necessary to develop an ‘eenheidsbesef’ [unitary consciousness]: that is, an intellectual appreciation of a common bond necessary for a modern state to evolve. Education would also release the narrow cultural and religious loyalties – evidently a reference to the aims of the proponents of adatrecht – to allow recognition of a broader community.

Conservative colonial politicians resisted the idea of a single polity, arguing that ‘the fundamental fact of the separateness of individuals and races’ could not be erased, accusing ‘associationists’ of ‘glossing over of the existing and unbridgeable cultural and racial differences between the Dutch and the indigenous population’.

42 Ironically perhaps, both sides of the colonial debate were proven correct by Sukarno who, while espousing the significance


39 This was a key conceit of the influential Theosophical movement.

40 Chr. Snouck Hurgronje, Nederland en de Islam (Leiden 1911) 83. Cribb notes that, in 1922, ‘the colony was granted the status of Rijksdeel or dominion with a formal standing in the Kingdom equivalent to that of the Netherlands itself’. R. Cribb, ‘Introduction’, in: R. Cribb (ed.), The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations of the Netherlands Indies 1880-1942 (Leiden 1994) 4.

41 A.D.A. de Kat Angelino, Staatskundig beleid en bestuurszorg in Nederlandsch-Indië (The Hague 1931) volume 1, Part 2, 825.

of an ‘eenheidsbesef’ – a notion encapsulated in Benedict Anderson’s famous definition of nationalism as ‘imagined political community’ – after independence was forced to recognize that unity could only be asserted by military force.  

Kruyt and Pamona identity

Kruyt was driven by what Schrauwers has argued was a desire to develop a volkskerk [people’s church]: a Christian community expressive of the specific community culture on which it was based. His emphasis on developing (and reporting on) an ethnographic understanding of the people to whom he wished to bring the Christian message, his deep involvement in the processes that defined the Pamona territorially and politically, and his strategic manipulation of government-imposed changes, placed him at the centre of the processes that were defining ‘modern Pamona’. Kruyt, with the detailed knowledge accumulated by dint of his and Adriani’s diligent research over the preceding decade, was able to take advantage of the complete ignorance of archipelagic societies such as the Pamona on the part of the colonial government. He was able to convince local administrators of the need to exclude all foreigners, including Europeans and Chinese, but specifically Muslims (whether as private citizens, traders or government personnel), in the interest of protecting vulnerable Pamona from undesirable influences now that Central Sulawesi had been opened up to the world. In a similar vein, Kruyt successfully insisted that the mission had exclusive control of all educational facilities within the territory, in order to ensure the introduction of a coherent message. Although increasingly challenged by local administrators trained to see their role as the drivers of development and protectors of ‘adat’ (as contradictory as these two were), the Poso mission succeeded in maintaining an almost exclusive position of influence in the Pamona territories for forty years.

Over time, however, mission authority was gradually curtailed. As local colonial officials themselves collated information on Pamona culture, they too gained enough confidence and expertise to assume control of ‘development work’ without the assistance of missionary informants. Moreover, as the central colonial administration generated ‘development’ expertise and established centralised bureaucracies to deal with agricultural, education,

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43 While a Dutch-imposed federal state was stridently opposed at the centre of the nationalist movement, in fact the most prominent states away from the centre, in Sulawesi and Sumatra, fought for greater representation, which amounted to much the same. The possibility of a federation had been suggested by De Kat Angelino, Staatskundig beleid, volume 1, Part 2, 826.

A Toradja-clan elder with wife and child, Central Sulawesi, ca. 1915.
KITLV Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, Leiden.
health and trade issues, and as increasingly centralised administration imposed greater uniformity in the regions, the scope for missionaries to create new structures diminished. Nevertheless, prior to 1942, largely through Kruyt’s (and his son’s) ability to maintain strategic connections in ‘high places’ and Kruyt’s vigilance in protecting mission activities against what he saw as colonial officedom’s inroads into his domain, the mission was able to maintain a commanding position in reshaping Pamona identity.

Kruyt operated on principles that were similar to, but distinct from, those of colonial practice. In dominating the Pamona environment and effectively isolating the Pamona from both significant colonial intervention and, more importantly, from the surrounding Sulawesian environment, he ensured that – within certain limits – Pamona society remained ‘intact’. Kruyt’s emphasis on an ‘organic’, ‘whole-community’ approach brought about, if not the dramatic immediate ‘results’ mission authorities and colonial officials wanted, at least demonstrably a firm basis for a long-term outcome represented by the autonomous Christian Pamona community that emerged after 1945.

Three key elements of mission policy contributed to the formation of a distinct Pamona Christian identity by the end of the colonial era. Firstly, the mission policy of insisting on the use of the local bare’e language in everyday contact with the Pamona. In initially working to translate the oral language and literature into a standardized written form, Kruyt defined the language of the modern Pamona, which identified both their existence in the modern world and, paradoxically, isolated them from it. While colonialism established Malay as the universal language of the united colonial state, the mission church lodged itself within the ‘old language’, and thus, seemingly, within the intimate world of old Pamona society. This meant, among other things, that colonial officials who, while necessarily conversant in Malay but never stationed long enough in this outback posting to be able to sufficiently master the local language, were never able to penetrate Pamona society to the extent that Kruyt and his missionaries could. This was reinforced by his success in keeping out all ‘foreigners’ (including even Christian Minahassans from North Sulawesi) from Pamona society by refusing to permit intermarriage and evicting anyone who erred.

Secondly, and more directly emanating from his core missiologist principles, despite the detail of his intensive ethnographic research, the outcome of Kruyt’s research (together with his language and schooling policy and practice) was to construct a common Pamona language and culture. This effectively obscured and fused whatever clan distinctions there once may have been, while colonial surveillance contributed to this by suppressing any remaining manifestations of traditional rivalries. Moreover, with the
suppression of ‘unacceptable’ practices, Kruyt’s ethnography helped define and normalise those practices and traditions which were ‘acceptable’ and which were gradually generalised by their overt or implicit incorporation into the structures and practices of the evolving Christian church communities. Over time then, a clan-neutral and common identity was formed that defined a ‘modern’ Pamona culture, sharply differentiated from its ethnic and cultural neighbours. 46

Thirdly, Kruyt’s policy of maintaining as much as acceptable of Pamona culture meant that he avoided dramatically challenging traditional social structures. Kruyt’s archive makes it clear that the selection of teachers and church leaders and his nominations for the administrative positions of village and district chief were made from within the socially elite group of kebosenya — if these were Animist, they were at least neutral as regards Christianity. This meant that representatives of respected and influential village families and clan elders continued to occupy positions of village and district authority, including those of teacher, preacher and church elder, and were directly involved in ‘processing’ modernity. Kruyt was also explicit in his policy of selecting students for his mission teacher training school, and previously of the boys and girls adopted into missionary homes for ‘upbringing’. It was from these carefully nurtured individuals that the future ‘gurus’ and Christian community leaders were selected, and amongst whom marriage partners were encouraged: children of former slaves (a position declared illegal after 1905) were explicitly ignored. There was thus a direct infusion of traditional structure of social influence into the structure of the emerging church community.

As a result, by 1925 over a third of the population — 15,553 of a population of just over 40,000 — had been baptised, 93 schools established in 129 villages taught by 54 trained Pamona teachers catering for a school-going population of over 4,000 children. By 1938 (the last year for pre-war mission statistics), there was a reported church membership of 41,656, a total number of baptisms for that year of 2,239 (1,857 of whom were children) and almost 5,000 school children, almost half of whom were girls, in 88 subsidised mission schools. 47 On the other hand, while local ‘gurus’ typically doubled as leaders of local church congregations, in 1940 there were not as yet any Pamona representatives at the Poso mission ‘conference’, let alone an elected community Synod on the model typical for Protestant churches in the Netherlands. The Poso mission, maintaining to the last a tight supervision of

46 As Napu, Bada and Besoa communities were incorporated into the Poso mission, the bare’e language was substituted for both church and school use to simplify the supply of teachers and school books.

school and church, school teacher and bible teacher, policy and funding, had avoided establishing an autonomous indigenous church structure, creating indigenous positions of authority or confirming a Christian adat or formal code of Christian conduct. This had left the emerging Pamona Christian community largely dependent on the mission to regulate, define and approve an evolving practice. Not until 1938 – barely four years before the arrival of the Japanese – did the mission conference create the position of, and nominate indigenous candidates to act as representatives of clusters of regional church communities – *klassis voorzitters* – which envisaged, but never established, an autonomous, indigenous church structure modelled on traditional democratic Protestant Dutch church administration.

Beyond the mission, the level of economic welfare of the people appears to have benefitted little. Aside from continuing high levels of adult and infant mortality, the regional economy remained very much as it was: a product of indigenous activity, principally in the Poso region, in terms of forest produce. There was little if any colonial investment. In part this was a result of Kruyt’s policies, but more generally it was because, however good the intentions of local officials, the colonial government was not interested: ‘*in the Outer Islands, like a night watchman, the government levied taxes and maintained law and order*’. Development, as made clear in the *Memorie van Overgave* of 1933, focussed on road and bridge building, with over a hundred kilometres of hardened main arterial roads suitable for modern vehicles constructed, linking the administrative centre of Poso with other major centres such as Tojo, Ampana and Kolonodale via the mission centre of the time, Tentena.

The problem, the report noted as a way of excusing the poor rate of road building, was ‘the limited number of people who were *herendienstplchtig*’, that is, those liable to be called up for compulsory labour to undertake such public works. By the 1930s, moreover, the global recession further undermined local development. The crash in world resin prices, in conjunction with the high transport costs charged by the shipping line, *KPM* [Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij], effectively ensured that ‘*the collection of rattan and dammar as a means of existence in these areas has disappeared*’. As a consequence, the local treasury suffered both from a loss of customs duties and from a forced reduction in personal taxation and *schoolgeld* [the school tax] in areas affected by the world depression. Nevertheless, while the depression may have exaggerated the failure to achieve the promised goal of the broader colonial mission, overall in areas such as Central Sulawesi, where ‘*there was hardly

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any foreign trade at all, stagnation prevailed and little economic expansion took place’. Such regions effectively drifted on ‘the periphery of (economic) expansion’.

If this belied the vision of colonial rhetoric, it did at least equate with what Kruyt envisioned and worked so hard to protect. Isolated, experiencing little impact from external influences, remaining largely self-sufficient and not experiencing a significant level of economic change, the three decades from 1910 to 1940 established a firm basis for a modern sense of self-identity rooted in traditional foundations of culture, clan, and territory. Over three decades, conformance to the new ‘adat’ had been promoted on a daily basis by leaders of their own community through constant contact and active engagement with a small group of European missionaries. This experience had not been undermined by colonial officials, who – despite criticisms – had largely tolerated the mission presence, and significantly reinforced by the growing numbers of a new generation graduating from a Pamona-language, modern education system.

Maintaining cultural identity after colonialism

In the light of the Indonesian state’s recent return to a policy of decentralization, such histories require renewed attention to find the origins of the separate ‘identity claims’ that, as John Bowen has argued, have proven more engrained and most contentious in constituting the contemporary tensions within the cultural plurality of the Indonesian republic. Yet, at the same time, and in the light of the same contemporary concerns, such historical investigations need also to examine the pathway via which such dislocated areas established the necessary ‘eenheidsgevoel’ [sense of unity] that produced the multiculturality, the ‘existence and equitable interaction of various cultures’ that is Indonesia.

The above sketch suggests that, within the framework of a modernising colonial state, the Poso mission worked to achieve a specific outcome that largely concurred with broad colonial objectives, yet in important ways also offered a significant variation from these. In ‘guarding’ and yet simultaneously modernising Pamona identity, Kruyt had moved well beyond the ambiguous efforts of the ‘adat school’ in raising consciousness of existing ethno-cultural differences. Hence, both as an embrionic Christian community and as a region

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50 Touwen, Extremes, 229.
where mission interests were omnipresent, the Poso region – like other regions of intense mission influence and/or on the periphery of the colonial state – confronted the idea of Indonesia with a significantly different prehistory than those regions of Indonesia which had been central to it. Yet the ‘product’ remained fragile; it could well have been destroyed after 1942 had this not been safeguarded, and arguably reinforced, by the policies of the wartime Japanese administration.

Deprived of mission leadership when European missionaries were incarcerated during the Japanese occupation, existing Pamona gurus and Bible teachers, together with Christian village leaders, attempted to hold the embryonic communities together. Both before the active Japanese intervention in inland Sulawesi (around July 1942) and immediately after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Pamona church leaders, their Christian communities and church and school buildings were attacked by nationalist Merah-Putih guerrilla groups suspicious of Christian allegiances and assuming that the envisaged Republic had a single Islamic identity. As early as January 1942, following news of the Japanese arrival in the archipelago and two months before the colonial surrender, nationalist groups in Gorontalo proclaimed Indonesian independence, raised the Indonesian flag and proceeded to attack Dutch colonial posts. Gorontalo-based guerrilla groups to the north and Luwu-based groups to the south terrorized the inland Christian ‘island’, suspicious of what was perceived to be its pro-Dutch inhabitants. Existing written and oral reports recount individuals and even whole communities forced to convert to Islam, some individuals being murdered and many intimidated.52

By July 1942, however, Japanese authorities had established control of the inland and insisted that all pre-war territorial boundaries, religious affiliations and practices be respected and retained.53 In similar fashion, after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, when once again Christian

52 My understanding of the Pamona experience of the Merah-Putih is based on a typescript account written retrospectively by wartime Pamona Christian community war leader in Central Sulawesi, Mahadi Tamauka, ‘Perkerjaan zending disekitar tahun 1941-1945’, typescript (no date) and Sejarah Kebangkitan Nasional: Daerah Sulawesi Tengah, prepared by Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah, Pusat Penelitian Sejarah dan Budaya (Jakarta 1978-1979). This and similar documentary material has been added to on the basis of extensive interviews by regional historians. H. Sadi et al., Sejarah Poso (Yogyakarta 2004).

53 Although the Japanese administration prohibited the teaching of religion or Bible studies in schools, as well as sermons, and imprisoned Christian leaders contravening prohibitions on preaching or accused of being Dutch spies, Islamic ‘revolutionaries’ who attacked Christian communities were also punished.
communities were attacked, threats to the inland Christian communities were ended with the intervention of initially Australian\textsuperscript{54}, and subsequently the returning Dutch, forces. Without these repeated interventions it is unlikely that these minority Christian communities and their embryonic Church structures could have been sustained.

Policies of the Japanese administration had the effect of cementing the process of Pamona Christian identity not only by once more isolating (protecting) the Pamona but, more directly, by demanding from the community a degree of autonomous initiative denied by either the pre-war Dutch missionary or colonial authority. Japanese youth policy, for instance, inadvertently strengthened Pamona Christian communities by requiring (Christian) village heads to mobilize youth groups for community work, and later paramilitary training. In as far as local Christian leaders retained control of these groups, they were used to further instill, in a practical way, commitment to community identity and later provided the basis of a Christian militia to protect Christian communities. More generally, Japanese insistence on active self-organisation left a legacy, according to an immediate post-war mission survey, of people more keen to self-organize, which further ingrained a strong sense of localised ethnic identity centred on the church’s leadership. Finally, Japanese requirements for isolated Christian communities to be integrated into a regional Protestant Church structure headed by a Japanese pastor, with headquarters in Makassar, and to insist on the use of the Malay language, provided local Pamona Christian community leaders with a first sense of their representative authority, as they were recognized outside their communities as speaking on behalf of these communities, and as part of a larger Christian community.\textsuperscript{55}

For the first time, Pamona Christians were connected to a wider Indonesian Christian and representative Indonesian world, while concurrently being attuned to a Japanese-orchestrated rhetoric of unity, anti-colonialism and independence. At the same time, Pamona ethnic identity was further defined, not so much in contrast to the Japanese – or against the absent Dutch – but against neighbouring Sulawesians, and in particular Minahassans.

After 1945, with the return of Dutch missionaries and the construction of the Government of East Indonesia, a new period of ambiguity in Church governance commenced. The returning missionaries had to recognize as a fait accompli the self-declared independence of the Pamona church, the

\textsuperscript{54} A. Reid, ‘Australia’s Hundred Days in South Sulawesi’, in: D. Chandler and M. Ricklefs (eds.), Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Indonesia: Essays in Honour of Professor J.D. Legge (Clayton 1986).

Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah, and the authority of the leadership that had evolved during the Japanese interregnum. Mission documentation suggests missionaries now had to move more cautiously to renegotiate their position within the Pamona Christian community. In 1946-1947, the mission hastily completed the process reluctantly introduced in the months before the arrival of the Japanese of recognising Pamona representation in church government. Following Dutch Protestant practice, this structure included lay and religious representatives reaching up from the village church, via church districts or classis, to the church’s governing body, the Synod.56

In the interim, however, the mission took the opportunity to negotiate with the incoming colonial government desperate to re-establish its administrative structures, an expansion of its authority to administer schools throughout an expanded province of Central Sulawesi. By resuming control of schools and associated government subsidy arrangements, the mission was effectively enabled to resume administrative control of the church’s activities for another decade, leaving a numerically Pamona-dominated synod with largely symbolic control.57 As a consequence, the mission was able to maintain effective supervision of the young church until in 1950 when, in a surprise vote, it lost control of the chairmanship of the Synod, which eventually expelled the missionaries.58

Jan Kruyt and the majority of his missionaries argued, in an increasingly complex environment, that Pamona Christians were not yet ready for independence. While critical of the chauvinistic attitudes of the Dutch churches at home, and accepting of the need and inevitability of a future independent church and nation, the Pamona mission group believed their work was not yet done. Indeed, in the immediate, difficult post-war years, the mission took several strategic decisions designed both to extend its own influence and protect its pre-war policies of promoting a separate church community. Crucial here in the context of Indonesian nationalism were its efforts to prevent the introduction of Malay (Indonesian) as the language medium in its churches, which could have resulted in the loss of the Pamona

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56 For sake of brevity, this section of the paper is a general summary of the main issues that emerge from the archive of the Poso mission for the period 1946-1954. This consists of correspondence between individual missionaries, with the Dutch and Jakarta mission headquarters, and reports of Synod meetings.

57 European missionaries retained control of the chairmanship of the Synod by block voting and exerting ‘superior’ influence. They were nevertheless unseated as head of the Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah (GKST) Synod in a ‘shock’ vote in 1952.

58 The post-1945 history of the Poso mission is briefly summarised by Jan Kruyt, who remained head of the mission, in his Het Zendingsveld Poso. Geschiedenis van een confrontatie (Kampen 1970) 362-368. This provides a somewhat sanitised interpretation of the emotive debates of the period.
language as the central element in the identity of the Pamona Christian community and its absorption into a wider Indonesian protestant church.

This ‘victory’ was achieved against the backdrop of two significant sets of pressures acting to draw Panoma’s identity into the emerging unitary state. On the one hand there was some support amongst Pamona church leaders for the continued use of Indonesian, introduced during the Japanese period. Separate Central Sulawesi Christian communities in the northwest, established under the auspices of the Salvation Army, and in the East, established by the *Indische Kerk* [Indies Church], had always used Malay but now, as the language of Indonesia, the language also became a symbol that marked the nationalist credentials of Christian organisations. This made it a particularly significant issue for an emerging national Indonesian Protestant church wanting to distance itself from association with colonialism. Having incorporated the former *Indische Kerk* communities into its area of educational responsibility, the question of language became a specific issue for the Poso mission. The enlarged post-war mission field was now divided along linguist lines, and the new Synod was forced to decide how to deal with this in terms of training local teachers and pastors. The final resolution, to continue to use Malay (Indonesian) in the East for the To Wana churches and in official church documents and communications with the outside world, but to continue to use *bare’e* in the Pamona churches, was no doubt one that met the immediate approval of Pamona members.

Amongst Poso missionaries, there was disagreement on the question of whether a future Pamona church should link up within an archipelago-wide or a regional church organisation. While most supported or recognized the inevitability of the Pamona church’s independence from Dutch church and mission tutelage, few members of the Poso mission conference supported amalgamation. After surveying his missionary colleagues, Jan Kruyt concluded that the majority were in support of his view that the Pamona church should do nothing that could undermine its distinctive ethnic identity, that had been developed so painstakingly over half a century. The returning colonial administration, short of resources and desperate to reassert its influence, had offered the mission the opportunity to develop a broader church structure embracing the whole of the Central Sulawesi heartland and, in a sense, to give it a leadership role in the organisational structure of Sulawesi Protestant Churches that the Japanese had initiated. But such a change went too far and too fast for Pamona leaders, who remained focussed on sustaining their own community.

By the end of the 1940s, its leaders firmly embedded by mission policy and Japanese administration as the leadership of the Pamona communities, had established virtual ‘grassroots’ control, which was finally and explicitly asserted in 1954. From then on, the church leadership spoke for and led the Central Sulawesi communities through the violent years of the Permesta,
forming its own guerrilla force and forging its own demands on the central government in Jakarta when it finally gained recognition of its provincial status in 1964.59

Conclusion

The history of the Protestant mission in Indonesia includes a number of ‘high profile’ examples, of which the Poso mission is one, of how mission intervention in the process of colonisation contributed to intensifying latent indigenous geographical and identity boundaries in the archipelago. Perhaps nowhere else, other than in northern Sumatra, where the Rhenish mission achieved a similar ‘success’ amongst the Batak people in a similar set of political and ethnic circumstances, was a mission able to so effectively infuse an ethnic community with a Christian identity. In both cases, the ethnographic orientation of their missiology enabled missionaries to thread a Christian message into an indigenous cultural fabric to produce a Christian ethnic identity. It could be said that, in these cases, mission intervention shaped an ethnic culture and identity that contributed to the multiculturality that came to characterise the Indonesian Republic.

In a comparative study of South Africa and colonial Indonesia, Schrauwers and James argue that the disparate nature of Dutch Protestant missionary endeavour reflected the ‘Calvinist vision of separation’ and ‘made for a colonialism of a very special type’. Dutch colonial policy, they argue, in so far as mission policy was concerned, was intent on producing a ‘volkskerk’ network, ‘to enable subject people’s to salvage and stay true to their own cultural ethos’. Such attempts, they believe, were akin to attempts to ‘pillarize’ the dependent and separate indigenous nations by encouraging religiously inscribed ethnic identities: a policy which in South Africa evolved into the ideology of apartheid.60 The history of the Poso mission does not provide evidence for such a conclusion. The outline of the mission’s policy sketched above suggests that particular outcomes, such as that of the Pamona church, were the result of specific histories – of the actions of individual mission leaders acting in discrete and unique situations within individual communities with separate histories. While a symbiosis of sorts

existed between government and mission policies, the two arms of Western civilisation remained ontologically divided.

The above historical sketch does however demonstrate that Dutch colonial policy did attempt to impose a standard structure across a heterogeneous archipelagic population, which pointed the way towards the construction of a unitary state based on the management of ‘diversity’. While never able to assert a hegemonic influence, it established structures that facilitated the delineation of separate ethnic communities and, where politically convenient, employed the intervention of Christian missions to disrupt what appear to have been an evolving, competing historical trajectory of the Islamisation of the archipelago’s diverse ethnic communities. In Sulawesi, we might suggest that fifty years of colonial intervention created a hiatus in, and a major diversion from, what otherwise might have been the Islamic trajectory of a modern Sulawesian history. But this is a ‘might have been’ view of history. In fact, the mission created new boundaries, consolidated emergent ones and promoted a modern ethnic self-identity in which a Christian identity is deeply embedded as part of an Indonesian one.

In as far as the new Indonesian nation is the heir to the colonial state, it might be supposed that a colonial construction of the Kingdom of Poso, without missionary intervention, may have ‘slipped’ much more easily into the unitary state of Indonesia than the Christian community of Pamona. In spite of the hegemonic ambitions of colonial practice, it can be argued that mission activity laid the basis for a distinct modern Christian Pamona identity; that the passage of Central Sulawesi’s distinct identity into what became independent Indonesia was, in the final analysis, only made possible by the Japanese occupation. It was regional politics in the decade following the Japanese surrender in 1945 – the internal national struggle to impose a unitary state that was not finally resolved till 1964 – that ultimately vouchsafed Pamona’s absorption as a distinct and autonomous entity into the new political order thereafter.

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Oude schotjes geest

Dat breekt, maar door?

Ik zie niets van een doorbraak.