
This Amsterdam dissertation has a clear and persuasive argument. It maintains that the development of the land forces of the nascent Dutch Republic into a modern professional army did not begin as if de novo in the 1590s, with reforms instituted by Prince Maurits van Nassau and his cousin, Willem Lodewijk. Rather, the professionalization of the infantry (especially) and of the cavalry is better understood as a step-by-step process that began with changes introduced by Charles V, and was guided further by William of Orange. In other words, as against the general idea of a Military Revolution, as advocated by Michael Roberts and Geoffrey Parker, and against the idea of a specifically Dutch revolution in discipline and tactics in the 1590s as propounded by Gerhard Oestreich and Werner Hahlweg, this is a classic argument for continuity. As Dr. Swart indicates in the Introduction, his study builds on the work of recent critics of the ‘military revolution’ thesis, including Jeremy Black. To describe the process that is at the center of his discussion he eschews the term ‘disciplining’ (from Oestreich and Hahlweg) in favor of the idea of ‘professionalization’, as proposed by David Trim.

One profound continuity between Charles V’s wars against France and the Dutch war of independence was that commanders-in-chief in both cases were heavily dependent on infantry recruited from Germany, and organized into companies of Landsknechte. (The author notes the great disparity between a soldier’s wages and those of skilled craftsmen in the rebel provinces, but does not discuss its possible implications for the recruitment of troops on the Revolt’s home ground.) As of about 1550, a company of 300 or 400 or so Landsknechte functioned as a quasi-independent military corporation. The men would have a captain commissioned by the colonel of the regiment to which their company belonged, but they elected their own subalterns, and had procedures for gathering together on their own, e.g. (if pay was in arrears) to decide whether to remain in the service of their present employer. Charles V broke with this tradition, at least in theory, when he decreed (1554) that subalterns were henceforth to be appointed by the company captain. Once the rebellion established a foothold in Holland and Zeeland, Orange, who had at a young age held high command positions in Charles’s Netherlands army, picked up where the emperor had left off. In terms of discipline, his most important innovations were to reduce the company to a manageable size (150 men instead of 300), and to abolish the traditional practice by which the men of a company formed a solemn ‘ring’ to stand in judgment on fellow-soldiers accused of violating the laws of war, e.g. by the wanton murder of civilians. Instead, he improved on the office of provost-marshal (created by Charles V) by appointing (with the consent of the States) provosts who would be responsible for military justice in each regiment.

The notion of a revolution in infantry tactics – in particular, Hahlweg’s idea that Prince Maurits and Willem Hendrik used the contra-march to train their
men to fire in volleys – has also suffered at the hands of recent critics (here the continuities over the course of the sixteenth century have been pointed out by Bert Hall). Swart has no interest in denying that Maurits was a better tactician or a more successful commander than his father, but he shows here too that William of Orange played his part in a longer development, in particular by significantly increasing the ratio of arquebusiers to pikemen in his infantry companies, an idea he may have gleaned from his participation in Huguenot military campaigns of the late 1560s.

There is, by contrast, not much to be said for William of Orange as a strategist, and Swart recognizes the limitations of his case in this regard. The war that Orange directed against the king of Spain’s forces was a defensive war, and Swart contents himself with remarking that in the military traditions of the time, one of a commander-in-chief’s tasks was to recognize when his resources were such as to enable nothing more than a defensive posture. It is at this point I would have my one criticism of this fine study. Dr. Swart makes uses of the resolutions of the States General and of the provincial States, along with military archives that few recent scholars have consulted, but I suggest that a fuller reading of the resolutions – particularly those of the States of Holland – might put the question of strategic choice in a different light: Orange fought a defensive war not because he wanted to, but because the States of Holland would not support the more expensive and more risky offensive war His Excellency would have preferred to fight.

James D. Tracy, University of Minneapolis


De kernvraag die Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk zich in deze dissertatie stelt is hoe de positie van vrouwen op de arbeidsmarkt, en de daarmee samenhangende veranderende verdeling in arbeid naar sekse in de pre-industriële periode in de Republiek zich heeft ontwikkeld. Zij onderzocht hiervoor een van de belangrijkste sectoren van de pre-industriële economie, de textielnijverheid. Hierbij is ze niet a priori uitgegaan van een verslechtering van de positie van vrouwen, maar stelt ze de feitelijke veranderingen centraal.

In het eerste hoofdstuk wordt een theorethisch kader geschetst waarbinnen de vraag tot nu toe behandeld is. Achtereenvolgens komen technologische, economische, institutionele en sociaal-culturele verklaringen aan bod. Vervolgens worden in zeven volgende hoofdstukken de veranderingsprocessen die met de verschillende verklaringsmodellen samenhangen behandeld. In hoofdstuk 2, ‘Textiel, techniek en technologie’ wordt een korte schets gegeven van de technologische veranderingen in de textiel in de onderzochte periode. Technologische veranderingen als zodanig, zo concludeert Van Nederveen