The Civic Militia in the County of Holland, 1560-81: Politics and Public Order in the Dutch Revolt*

J. C. GRAYSON

I

The social history of the Revolt of the Netherlands remains relatively unexplored. This is especially so in the northern provinces where archives are fewer, and society was less complex than the south. Yet it was in the 'backward' north that a new state, the Dutch Republic, was created and the local history of its core-province, Holland, is of particular interest.

It is difficult to study the towns of Holland without feeling that though a certain amount can be learned about the patrician élite including the 'vroedschappen', or councils, the social levels below them are obscure. Yet the political developments of 1560-81 cannot be understood without some reference to these lower groups. Historians have consistently recognised that the attitude of the civic militia in particular was decisive in the iconoclastic riots of 1566 and the revolution of 1572 in Holland, but no detailed study of these bodies has previously been undertaken

The militia were in theory, the only force available to the patricians to maintain their authority against internal and external threats. In 1566 and 1572 it was vital to know how far the magistrates could rely on them. In this sense, the magistrates were confronted by various demands - from above, they faced the central

* I wish to acknowledge the generosity of the Leverhulme Trust and the British Academy, who enabled me, by the award of a European Research Studentship and a Fellowship under the Thank-Offering to Britain European Research Fund, to spend the academic years 1974-6 in the Netherlands, working on sixteenth century Dutch social and political history. I am also grateful to Dr. J. J. Woltjer and the Contactgroep 16de eeuw at Leiden, to Professor K. W. Swart and the Dutch History Seminar at London, and to Mr. S. F. C. Moore for much helpful advice.

government at Brussels, and its agents, the provincial Court of Holland at The Hague, and the provincial governor or 'stadhouder'; from within they might fear unrest among citizen groups discontented for social or religious reasons; externally they competed with other towns or the countryside.

Both economic and political pressures grew more urgent in the 1560's, when severe trade recession hit a society which had already been suffering from the decline of some of its staple activities for several decades. The textile industry in Leiden reached its nadir in this period, when tax assessment registers reveal a city which reverted to a role as processor of the products of local agriculture. In Hoorn, the much smaller cloth industry died out. In Delft, Gouda and Haarlem, brewing faced increasing competition and the loss of traditional markets in the south Netherlands. Delft remained a brewing centre, while Gouda and Haarlem declined to local importance, but the survival of Delft was helped by technical changes in the scale of production which benefited those who already had the capital to invest in new equipment. Dordrecht and Rotterdam were more dependent on trade than on industry, but Dordrecht had to struggle with the silting up and shifting course of the Merwede, which favoured the fast rising port of Rotterdam, still in the 1560's a small town of about five thousand people. Rotterdam was almost completely dependent on commerce and fishing, a place of few social extremes, where the patriciate was not so far removed from the mass of the inhabitants as elsewhere. Rotterdam and Amsterdam were thus more prosperous than the other towns of the province, Amsterdam in particular already thriving on the Baltic grain trade, though this was hard hit by the closure of the Sound and the Swedish-Danish war in 1565-7. English cloth exports passed largely through the south Netherlands, though of course the clothbuyers of Holland were among those who suffered from the stoppage of the cloth trade in 1564-5. There were some mitigating features in the Holland economy, however. Cheap water transport, the accessibility of Baltic grain at Amsterdam, and the readiness of the civic authorities to provide food in time of dearth, all helped to prevent serious 'crises de subsistances'. Men who found it impossible to earn a living in the restrictive atmosphere of urban guild and tax regulations could often survive by establishing their trade outside the town jurisdiction, often under the
protection of a local noble. At Alkmaar, even men of the militia class had taken this course.

The religious passions of the Holland towns were not as inflamed as those of the south, where calvinists and other protestants were far more numerous at least until the 1580's. Though the government put increasing pressure on local magistrates to convict heretics, their response was generally unenthusiastic. A few recalcitrant anabaptists were executed or exiled, often after they had already fled, but other heretics were more often sentenced to a penance. Those executed were in many cases outsiders rather than natives. Town authorities were hostile to attempts to deprive them of their traditional role in maintaining religious uniformity, and opposed both the inquisition and the evocation of cases of heresy to higher tribunals as attacks on their privileges. In the extreme north of Holland where the presence of the government was minimal, anabaptists remained largely undisturbed. The iconoclastic riots of 1566 in Holland were in many cases precipitated by reaction to news from the south, rather than by deepseated religious hostilities in the province itself.

It can be argued that the men who served in the militia were more likely to suffer from the economic recession than their superiors, for even if their businesses were in temporary decline, the patricians retained their capital and often invested in land. Wealth distribution in the towns of Holland has not yet been systematically studied, and our sources, the registers of tax assessments, are


E. M. A. Timmer, 'Grepen uit de geschiedenis der Delftsche brounnering', De economist, LXX (1920) 358-73, 415-30; T. S. Jansma, 'De betekenis van Dordrecht en Rotterdam omstreeks het midden van de zestiende eeuw', ibidem, XCI (1943) 947-84; R. J. Bijlsma, 'Rotterdams welvaren in de Spaansche tijd', Rotterdamsch jaarboekje, VIII (1910) 75-100; Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den handel met Engeland, Schotland en Ierland, 1485-1585, H. J. Smit, ed. (Rijks geschiedkundige publicatiën, grote serie, LXXVI, XCI; 2 vols., The Hague, 1928, 1950); II, 851-943, passim; E. C. G. Brünner, 'Maatregelen in 1565 van overheidswege genomen om de voedselvoorziening van de bevolking in Nederland te regelen', Bijdragen en mededelingen van het historisch genootschap, I (1929) 141-92; idem, De order op de buitennering, 1531 (Utrecht, 1923); N. W. Posthumus, 'Een zestiende eeuwse enquête naar de buitenneringen rondom de stad Leiden', Bijdragen en mededelingen van het historisch genootschap, XXIV (1912) 1-95.

3. These are patchily preserved and refer mostly to the tenth penny tax on real property, levied in 1553, 1561 and 1564; for Alkmaar, Gemeente archief (GA) Alkmaar, Oudarchief, 674,675, 707, 770; Amsterdam, Algemeen rijksarchief The Hague (ARA) Archive of the States of Holland before 1572 (cited as St.v.Holl., I, 155, 552, 892, 1206, 1538; for Delft, ARA, St.v.Holl., I, 187, 200, 590, 926; for Dordrecht, ARA, St.v.Holl., I, 191, 593, 929, 1243, 1587; for Gouda, ARA, St.v.Holl., I, 209, 613, 944; for Haarlem, ARA, St.v.Holl., I, 220, 624, 1271, 1588; for Leiden, ARA, St.v.Holl., 275, GA Leiden, secretarie archief, part I (before 1575), 922 and 993; for Rotterdam, ARA, St.v.Holl., I, 766, 1089, 1561.
partial and refer generally only to real property, but they suggest that the magistrates were not only wealthier, but very much wealthier, than those they ruled, though the social gulf was perhaps not as wide as in the great industrial cities of the south. Whether the craftsmen or artisans who served in the militia were also likely to be more receptive to the new religious doctrines, is a moot point. It seems that at least in the later sixteenth century, church councils tended to be recruited from rather lower social levels than the magistracies, though there was always some overlap. Studies of the social origins of those accused of heresy in the 1560's indicate that the highest and lowest social levels were both under-represented.

The year 1566 saw a crisis in political, economic and religious life. It was then that the militias' concepts of their role and of their loyalty to the patriciates were tested. In the second crisis of 1572, their willingness to resist the sea beggars was decisive in determining which towns went over to the cause of the revolt. There is a wider political question involved as well. The state which emerged in the 1580's was oligarchic, federal and particularist. Ultimate political power rested not with the States General or the provincial States but with the towns. It was the nature of power in the towns which decided the nature of power in the state. That power was held by oligarchies which became even more closed, more purely political and less involved in commerce, in the seventeenth century. The roots of this exclusivism lie in our period, and the importance of the militias is that they alone might have secured some say in politics for the lesser inhabitants, but despite the occasional gleam of promise, they failed to do so.

It would be a mistake to imagine that the militias were commonly active as a political force before 1566. Their political role was latent and unclear. What was important was that they were the only organisation to unite men of their social position, irrespective of their trades, in a body which had some force available. The trade and craft guilds had long ceased to play a political role, and though the 'Chambers of Rhetoric' - amateur literary and dramatic clubs - gave men of the militia class the chance to voice satirical criticisms of the church and the magistrates, they had no force behind them. The militia had that force. In 1566 and 1572 they made an issue of its use, especially the key question of firing on their fellow citizens. This revealed the importance of their concepts of the unity


which ought to prevail within the towns, a unity threatened both by the emergence of protestant heresy and by the repressive measures urged on the magistracies by the central government. Civic unity is arguably a more illuminating concept than class in sixteenth century Holland. In so far as the militias had a unity, it was 'civic' and political rather than an economic solidarity, which could scarcely be expected from a heterogeneous group of middling well-to-do small masters.

Indeed the heterogenity of the militias should be stressed. They were never uniform in politics or religion, including men who became calvinist church-councillors, and catholics who chose self-exile in 1572. Their response to the crises of 1566 and 1572 was bound to be confused as the older concept of civic unity was threatened by other more attractive forms of associative feeling, in particular the protestant sect.

True, some forms of protestantism seemed to undermine the unity of civic society by their very exclusiveness, the natural result of their emergence in a period of persecution in the 1560's and the closing of their ranks in the face of the indifference of many of the population in the 1570's, but there was a point of contact between the militia ideal, and that of the sects. Both stressed the right of the local community, whether town or church of true believers, to govern itself against the centralising policy in church and state being applied from Brussels under Philip II.

In their social composition, the militia were an élite of the second rank, not mere wage earners, but small masters with one or two apprentices, domestic servants, and a degree of economic independence. Actual property qualifications are infrequent but poorer artisans were excluded by the cost of arms. The patricians still had to take care to keep up the social level of the companies, both by excluding the poor and by sporadic attempts to prevent the rich from escaping their obligations to serve. In most towns militia service was a corollary of 'poorterschap', burgess status, which conferred legal privileges and in the 1560's was still required for membership of most guilds, though it was relaxed in the 1580's to allow many southern immigrants to set up their trades in the north. The militias of Leiden and Haarlem numbered four hundred out of adult male populations of about four thousand; in Amsterdam the six hundred militiamen were more of an élite, for the male population was about fifteen thousand.

On the basis of tax registers, some generalisations about the changes in the...
J. C. GRAYSON

social status of the militia can be made. It seems that the officers of the 1560s were all closely related to the members of the 'vroedschappen'. Service as an officer was often an apprenticeship for the magistracy. The 'N.C.O.'s' of the 1560's were not as greatly surpassed by their superiors in wealth, or in the likelihood of entering the magistracy, as their counterparts in the 1580's. There is also evidence of a decline in the social standing of the rank and file between the 1560's and the 1580's, which in Leiden can be traced to a decision in 1578 to open the militia to all inhabitants, of 'pooreter' status or not. Still, something of the old élite character survived. Leiden possesses exceptional sources for a social analysis of the population in 1578-81, and these allow us to compare the wealth of the male population at large with that of the militia men.

Table*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessed value</th>
<th>All male heads of Households</th>
<th>Militia heads of Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>113 (4.21%)</td>
<td>68 (17.52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fl. 1-4</td>
<td>271 (10.10%)</td>
<td>6 (1.54%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fl. 5-9</td>
<td>930 (34.66%)</td>
<td>15 (3.86%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fl. 10-19</td>
<td>852 (31.76%)</td>
<td>118 (30.41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fl. 20-40</td>
<td>434 (16.17%)</td>
<td>131 (33.76%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fl. 41-60</td>
<td>61 (2.27%)</td>
<td>33 (8.50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fl. 61-80</td>
<td>11 (0.4%)</td>
<td>10 (2.57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over Fl. 80</td>
<td>11 (0.4%)</td>
<td>7 (1.80%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>2683 (100%)</td>
<td>388! (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The average tax assessment for the population as a whole was F.13.2, while the assessments of the lower officers are clustered in the Fl.20-30 range. The professions were notably over-represented.

As always Amsterdam was a law unto itself. Its militia companies were clearly of higher social standing than those of the smaller towns. We have no lists of the

*Sources: the figures for assessments of householders are derived from F. Daelemans, 'Leiden in 1581, een sociaal-demografisch onderzoek', Afdeling Agrarische Geschiedenis Bijdragen, XIX (1975) 137-207, esp. Table 24, 190; this article is based on GA Leiden, sec. archief II, 1074, 'Beschryvinge van alle de poorters ende inwoonders deser stad Leyden gedaen in de maent Septembris 1581', a detailed census which distinguishes the militiamen. Tax registers of the Years around 1580 include sec. archief, II, 4016a, (the 'weekgeld' of 1578), 3980 (a forced loan on the very rich, 1580) 3988 (the Armada loan of 1588) and most important, sec archief, II, 6789, 'Liber Vetus', a massive register of all properties, with their values and owners, begun in 1584-5.
rank and file, but the officers included several men with large fortunes in trade, and many who lived in the fashionable Warmoesstraat.

Social decline was the concomitant of political eclipse, itself the result of the confrontation of the militia companies' ideal of civic unity with problems beyond its capacity to solve, first in the religious crisis of 1566, and later in the more truly revolutionary events of 1572.

II

Leiden in the early sixteenth century was not a town in which religious or social unrest was unduly prominent. The events of 1566 thus confronted the militias with unprecedented problems.

The first iconoclasm took place on 25 August 1566, but was soon suppressed by the 'burgemeesters'. The militia were involved only after the 'vroedschap' advised the 'burgemeesters' to take the advice of the dean, headmen and common militiamen. The actual request made by the 'burgemeesters' was that they would help prevent and hinder (iconoclasm) in order to keep the town in a good peace, as was fitting, at least until provision should be made herein by the advice of the common 'vroedschap'.

After a general debate the militia promised only to aid in removing the images to safety, but before this could be done there was a second riot on 26 August. The 'vroedschap', fearing the presence in the town of 'fullers, weavers, stonemasons, turf-carriers and that sort of people', now decided to remove the images without delay. It also went over to a more aggressive policy of intimidation, erecting a gallows, and proclaiming that 'from now on justice will

8. GA Amsterdam, handschriftenverzameling, Boek van ontvangst en uitgaaf der edele hantboogschutters, 1531-60; P. A. Meilink, Gegevens aangaande bedrijfskapitalen in de Hollandsche en Zeeuwsche handel, 1543', Economisch-historisch jaarboek, VIII (1922) 254-77; N. W. Posthumus, De uitvoer van Amsterdam, 1543-5 (Leiden, 1971); Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van het bedrijfsleven en het gildewezen van Amsterdam 1512-1632, J. G. van Dillen, ed. (Rijks geschiedkundige publicatiën, grote serie, LXIX-LXXVIII; The Hague, 1929-33) I, passim; Amsterdam in 1585, het kohier van de kapitale impositie van 1585, J. G. van Dillen, ed. (Amsterdam, 1941); J. Elias, De vroedschap van Amsterdam (2 vols., Amsterdam, 1903-5); R. E. van der Leeuw-Kistemaeker, Wonen en werken in de Warmoesstraat van de 14de tot het midden van de 16de eeuw (stencilled thesis, University of Amsterdam, Historisch seminarium, 1974).


be feared, and stranger itinerant preachers will be kept out of this town'. This was mere bluff, for executions might only provoke worse riots, and then the militia were the only means of keeping order. Apart from the general reluctance to call in troops of the central government, the paralysis of the court at Brussels since the fall of Granvelle in 1564 meant that the Regent, Margaret of Parma, was not in a position to give leadership. It was this absence of a rapid and effective response from Brussels which allowed the protestants in 1565-6 to make increasingly bold demands, as they felt surer of their ground. The alternative was to hire men from another source: in Leiden, the militia were particularly alarmed that the 'vroedschap' would engage the 'condottiere' Duke Eric of Brunswick. It had to be the militia, therefore, and the magistrates sought to ensure their loyalty by exacting an oath to protect religious buildings and to prevent the protestants occupying some of the deserted cloisters. A watch was also to be set at the gates, night and day  

It was at this point that the policy of the vroedschap was undermined by the news that the regent had been forced to concede many of the demands of the nobles. When the concession was proclaimed in Leiden, on 31 August 1566, the proclamation laid emphasis not on the limited freedom of protestant worship but on the penalties for further despoliation of church or monastic property  

Not until October 1566 did the Regent feel strong enough to apply more pressure to the towns. In Leiden, the 'vroedschap' reacted cautiously. When the militia were unwilling to hand over the town keys to them, rather than provoke 'tumult and commotion', the 'burgemeesters' accepted a compromise by which the keys were brought each night to the house of the eldest 'burgemeester'. A captain of militia then conveyed them to the Town Hall, where they were guarded by a militia detachment until the night watch was relieved by the day watch. It was not a satisfactory compromise, nor could the militia's loyalty be bought by the appointment of one of their headmen to the 'vroedschap', in November 1566. On the previous day Mass had been celebrated for the first time since the riots in August, but the situation was still very unstable. The approach of winter made it impossible to hold sermons in the open air, and the town pensionary, Paulus Buys, feared unrest in the countryside. The militiamen still suspected the 'vroedschap' of plotting to call in Eric of Brunswick, especially after 18 December 1566, when the 'vroedschap' voted, ostensibly to 'relieve' the militia, to raise a body of paid men to keep order  

11. GA Leiden, sec. archief, I, 1067a, for the oath; I, 388, ff. 271-4v for the ordinances on the watch.
on the wealthy and reliable\textsuperscript{14}, and it was not to be raised at once, but to be
delayed until the risk appeared worth taking. It had been begun by 14 January
1567 when Buys reported that the militia were critical of it. As they had been
exempted from payment, their criticism was not merely financial, but political.
They insisted that it was their duty to keep watch. Not only that, but Buys also
reported that

some of the new reformed religion from in or near this city had petitioned the
'burgemeesters' that the watch recently stood down should be re-established, and a
watch kept on the Town Hall and elsewhere, and that they (the reformed) were willing
to join the watch in order to avoid being attacked and plundered by the troops of Eric of
Brunswick\textsuperscript{15}.

The 'burgemeesters' rejected the request, which had been intended by the
reformed to win themselves some legitimacy and to present themselves not as the
instigators of the August riots but as the defenders of order. It failed in its
purpose, and with it any hopes the reformed may have had of a common front
between themselves and the militia. In the early months of 1567, the hope faded
as the reformed were increasingly isolated. Their preaching ceased on 20 April
1567 and their leader, Huych van Bancken, brother of the dean of one of the
militia guilds, was threatened with murder. It was this threat to law and order
which gave the 'burgemeesters' the chance to set up in April 1567 the paid watch
company at the Town Hall. The watchmen were all Leiden men, not the soldiers
of Duke Eric or of the central government.

The 'burgemeesters' policy was as far as possible to return to normal, and the
appearance of the militia in the annual procession of 11 May 1567 was a symbol
of this normality in both a religious and a secular sense. It was religious, for the
Host was carried in procession, and it was political in so far as all the corporations
of the town, 'vroedschap', 'burgemeesters', and militia were represented\textsuperscript{16}. If
Margaret of Parma had continued as regent this policy might have had some
success but her successor, Alva, took a more rigorous line than she or the
'burgemeesters' had wished. In early May twenty soldiers were quartered in the
town, often in the houses of protestants who had gone into exile. The
'burgemeesters' were eager to be rid of these troops. They presented a memorial
to the regent attempting to put their behaviour in a good light, but in June 1567,
on the orders of Bossu, the new 'Stadhouder' of Holland, they had to accept the

\textsuperscript{14} Their names are in \textit{ibidem}, 948, a list of the contributors with the amounts paid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibidem, 386, ff. 41-2.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibidem, 388, ff. 289v-90.
disarming of the citizenry, including the militia. Until 1571, order was kept by a band of paid men. The experience of Haarlem was similar to that of Leiden. Again, the magistracy seems to have been notably 'erasmian' in tone, (its pensionary had been Erasmus' secretary) and to have avoided rigorous persecution despite the presence of one of the new bishops in the city. Calvinist preaching began at nearby Overveen, in the fief of the Beggar nobleman Hendrik van Brederode, with whom the town had long been at loggerheads. But the 'vroedschap' of Haarlem tried to rely on persuasion rather than intimidation. 'Burgemeester' Van der Laen, called the militia for consultation and stressed the external threat to the city, from itinerant preachers and the anger of the government, which might revoke the city's privileges if the riots at Antwerp were repeated. Van der Laen also warned of the danger of looting, but was careful to assure the militia that he was sure they did not contain any heretics.

The Haarlem militiamen gave an answer similar to that of their counterparts in Leiden. They were willing to protect the town against strangers, and would not destroy any images themselves, but would not undertake to protect them against others. Even this answer was not unanimous, though when the 'burgemeesters' attempted to sound the opinion of each platoon separately, the militia refused to be drawn, and the officers, or 'vinders', men of the same families and social standing as the 'vroedschap', stood by their men. The feeling of civic unity was paramount. As the 'vinders' observed, the difficulty in an unconditional promise to protect the churches against looting was that 'if such a thing happened, one might peradventure strike his friends and kinsmen and thereby fall into civil strife and bloodshed'.

As it happened, the militia did keep order successfully in Haarlem over 1566-7, though the picture presented by the 'vroedschap' in its apologia to the government in 1567, of cordial relations between militia and 'vroedschap' was not wholly true. The 'vroedschap' had been reluctant to proclaim the terms of

the regent's answer to the Request of the Nobles, for fear of disturbances, and the day after the answer was received it had voted to raise a band of paid troops. It was even more unwilling to publish a letter from the Court of Holland threatening the loss of the city's privileges in the event of rioting, and feared that the militia would not accept it23. In September, 1566, commissioners of the Court were in Haarlem to supervise the annual choice of new magistrates. After a mass meeting held illegally without the consent of the 'burgemeesters', the militia men demanded that the commissioners should not appoint any 'schout' (sheriff) 'schepen', (justice) or 'vroedschap', who had not been a resident for ten years, paying scot and lot24. This was on the face of it a mere request that the written privileges of the city should be respected, but the point was that the militia had no right to make such a request, and in fact it was a personal attack on Van der Laen and three others, who were in breach of the formal requirements for office. Two of the irregular office holders stood down though not Van der Laen. It was a notable indication of how far the prestige of the 'vroedschap' had been challenged.

The incident was petty in itself, but it is a reminder that the crisis of authority in the Netherlands from 1564 to 1567 was not confined to the centre, but had its repercussions at the provincial and local levels. In no town of Holland was this more clearly revealed than in Delft25.

Both the main industries of the city, brewing and textiles, were at a low ebb in 1566. Tax collectors reported that taxpayers spoke ill of the 'vroedschap's failure to protect these trades, and Brederode's agent, Backerseel, was welcomed as 'a great master... who will take better care of our trade and welfare'. The 'vroedschap' therefore had more reason than many to be sensitive about its authority. It tried to ease economic distress by buying wool to set the poor on work26, a traditional response, and it was also traditional in wishing to retain its ordinary judicial competence in heresy cases against the inquisition, and in hoping to rely on the militia to keep order27. Similarly, the refusal for several weeks to accommodate the demands of the protestants was the response of a magistracy which intended to enforce its authority.

25. GA Delft, stadsarchief, 1st section, 56 (2 parts), a short account of the origin of the heresy in Delft, and a volume of depositions made in 1567 on the events of 1566, ed. by J. Smit as 'Hagepreeken en beeldenstorm te Delft, 1566-7', Bijdragen en mededelingen van het historisch genootschap, XLV (1924) 206-50; J. Soutendam, 'Beeldstormerij te Delft in augustus en oktober 1566', Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudeheidkunde, 2nd ser., IX (1877) 173-221. Drs. R. Kok kindly allowed me to see his University of Nijmegen 'candidaats'-thesis which contains a valuable tabulated list of heretics in Delft.
26. GA Delft, stadsarchief, 1st section, 16, f. 158.
27. Ibidem, 13, ff. 1v-2v.
The news from Antwerp reached Delft on 23 August 1566. Next day, the 'vroedschap' was gloomy about preventing disturbances, unless it had the support of the militia. This was not readily given. As elsewhere, they would not shed blood to defend images, and in particular would not identify themselves with the hated franciscans, always the most unpopular order, who were accused of being the principal supporters of the inquisition, and of having a 'blood book' of suspected heretics. The franciscan monastery was stormed twice on 24/25 August 1566, once by night and again the next day. The 'vroedschap' was as unwilling as the militia to fight for the franciscans, and advised them to leave the town for some weeks to avoid provoking further unrest.

It was still unwilling however, to accept the demands of the reformed for a place of worship in the town, or for the removal of the remaining images and altars for burning - a demand presented by an armed deputation, apparently rather overestimating its support, on 27 August 1566. Receiving no encouragement from the Court of Holland at The Hague, the 'vroedschap' called the militia, though not to a mass meeting as at Leiden or Haarlem, and according to depositions made in 1567 by the headmen, who were also 'vroedschap' members, extracted from them a promise of 'all help and assistance'. The promise was kept, at least to the extent of guarding the gates against possible incursions of the reformed on Sunday 1 September, and of dispersing a reformed congregation who had been meeting in the 'gasthuis' (hospital) as all the churches were locked from 24 August to 8 September. In mid-September, the 'vroedschap' allowed the reformed to worship in the fields outside the town walls, until the government should decide otherwise. In October, this permission was extended to allow a wooden church to be erected, but the reformed were still not satisfied. They were encouraged by the example of Amsterdam, where their co-religionists had taken over the franciscan monastery in late September, and the Delft franciscan house was their aim. It was again attacked, this time by women, surrounded by a cordon of men. The advantage of this was presumably that the women were not bound by any oath to the town. The militia, naturally unwilling to fire on the demonstration if it included their wives, refused to come out when the town tipstaff summoned them, on the flimsy pretext that they could only be

29. GA Delft, stadsarchief, 1st section, 56, f. 48.
summoned by the accustomed alarm bell. As elsewhere, the 'vroedschap' feared that ringing the alarm bell would only be the signal for general looting by the 'skippers, weavers, sackcarriers and other such rabble, who are only waiting for the chance to get their hands into the good people's treasure chests'.

On 8 October, the 'vroedschap' resolved that it would not resist if the reformed took possession of the franciscans' house. This was not enough, for the reformed demanded legitimacy within the civic framework, and this meant a formal cession of the monastery by the 'vroedschap'. The reformed themselves had no status in the community and had to rely on mediators - for the events of 1 September had shown them that force was not enough - but the significance of Delft was that the 'common front' of militia and reformed was rather more successful than elsewhere. The assumptions hinted at in Leiden and Haarlem, were explicitly stated in Delft. On 12 October, the 'vroedschap' ceded the franciscan monastery to the reformed, and claimed to have done so 'with the sixteen headmen of the militia and the commonalty'. The reality of the week of negotiation from 5-12 October 1566 was more complex and more startling than that bland phrase suggested.

After the third sacking of the franciscan monastery, the 'vroedschap' met on 6 October 1566, in the presence of commissioners of the Court of Holland, and summoned the crossbowmen that evening, appealing to them as 'members of the town', to take a more general oath than before, in order to assist the 'burgemeesters' and suppress any future riots. The answer of the company headmen, mostly 'vroedschap' members, reveals that they felt there was a conflict of interest between 'vroedschap' and militia. The rank and file distrusted their headmen, and demanded the right to choose their own spokesmen from their own ranks, before they were willing to give an answer to the oath. The 'burgemeesters' felt this to be a novelty, and denied that there could be any distinction of interests between militia and 'vroedschap', but they were unable to convince the crossbowmen. Next day, the second company, the axemen, also refused to be drawn into giving an answer without consultation with the third company, the arquebusiers. As in Haarlem and Leiden, the attempt to divide the militia companies had failed.

The axe and crossbow companies then chose eight spokesmen who handed over four demands. Between them, these demands would have given the militia a far

33. Our main source for this week is the narrative of the Commissioners of the Court of Holland, printed by Soutendam, ibidem, 180-210.
34. Ibidem, 185.
more important place in the government of the city. Each platoon of twenty five men was to have the right to nominate two or three men, from whom the 'vroedschap' would be bound to select the headmen. In any case of difficulty, these headmen were to consult with the common militiamen and report their advice back to the 'vroedschap', who were to reach a decision after further discussions with the headmen, the matter being arranged 'unanimously, by common advice, to the common wellbeing and tranquillity of the community'. The 'vroedschap' were not to place difficulties in the way of the headmen, if the latter wished to assemble the militia. These demands were intended to be a permanent feature of the civic government, and would have widened the circle of decision makers radically. In all the Holland towns, real political power rested with a small circle, often only a minority of the 'vroedschap', which might meet only to approve resolutions already prepared by the 'burgemeesters'. Delft, like Leiden, was one of the towns where the 'burgemeesters' enjoyed such powers.

The demands of the axe and crossbow militia were seconded by the arquebusiers, who were of rather higher social rank. The three companies challenged the 'burgemeesters' to produce the original ordinances on the city militia, and claimed that they were merely demanding a share in the running of the city, commensurate with the service they gave in risking their lives for it. The 'burgemeesters' flatly refused, and pointed out that they could not alter their constitution without the consent of the 'stadhouder' and Court of Holland, and that if there were any disturbance the king would strip them of their privileges. The confrontation of militia, 'vroedschap' and 'burgemeesters' had thus gone beyond the religious issue and become one of civic rights. The sixteen spokesmen of the three companies who appeared in the Town Hall on 9 October 1566, told the 'burgemeesters' that there were some among the militiamen who were unwilling to act against iconoclasm, but that they were not numerous in relation to the rest, with whom they were agreed on the other, political, points.

The militia were ready enough to perform their traditional police role, to prevent robbery of church and lay property, but they would not undertake to prevent reformed preaching in the town, and their reason is of the greatest importance:

they did not understand the office of the militiamen to be executors of His Majesty's placards, for in such a case they would make themselves enemies of many and diverse principal notable citizens of the town, who are still in the 'body of the town' even if they are not members of the militia, and who may perhaps be especially well disposed to hear the said preaching; which would cause great bloodshed among the citizenry, with whom the militia, both because of the unity of the citizenry, and the affinity of blood, desire to maintain all unanimity and tranquillity, in order to defend all the privileges and charters obtained, and to be obtained, to the benefit of the town and community... 36.

They urged the 'burgemeesters' to find suitable means to content the reformed, who were said to be numerous.

Nor were the militia the only representatives of urban opinion to make their voices heard. On 11 October 1566 they were joined by six spokesmen of the common citizenry, deputed by a meeting of two hundred in the marketplace. This deputation threatened to raise up to three thousand men if the reformed were not allowed to use the franciscan chapel. The demands of the citizens were not addressed in the first instance to the 'burgemeesters', but to 'their dearly beloved brethren, the headmen and other members to the militia', seen as the natural mediators of such a request.\footnote{Ibidem, 203-7.}

The 'burgemeesters' had no alternative. Not only could they not rely on the militia, but they were faced with a possible uprising of the citizens. On 8 October they had already resolved to 'tolerate' the occupation of the franciscan monastery if they could not prevent it, but now they had to swallow the reformed demand for a formal cession of the cloister. This was agreed on 12 October, publicly proclaimed the next day, but also accompanied by a resolution of the 'vroedschap' to raise forty four paid troops, and to enter a protest before the Court of Holland, that the cession of the monastery had been made under duress.\footnote{Ibidem, 210-4; GA Delft, stadsarchief, lst section, 1 part. ii, ff. 341-4, 13, part. i, f. 8.}

Over the winter of 1566-7, the town regained authority and was able to isolate the reformed, but relations between 'vroedschap', 'burgemeesters' and militia were still tense. The headmen had been allowed to draft a new ordinance, thus fulfilling one of their stated ambitions of the October crisis, the need for a definite regulation of their functions. The ordinance was drawn up after comparison with other towns and discussions with the rank and file in Delft. It maintained the idea of a division of interest between 'vroedschap' and militia, for one of the articles proposed that any militiaman appointed to the 'vroedschap' should be deprived of his place in the militia. The 'burgemeesters' felt that this would create 'discord, dissension and separation between the two colleges', while their authority would be further reduced if they were to grant the request that no further alterations were to be made to the militia ordinance without the consent of the headmen. They feared that this would spread the secrets of civic government too widely.

In the ordinance as it was actually published, the demand for the dismissal of militiamen appointed to the 'vroedschap' was rejected. The militia were still to have the right to nominate three candidates from each platoon for the post of
headmen, from whom the 'vroedschap' would choose one. The headmen were to have the right to choose new men to replace those who died or retired, and no-one was to be dismissed from the militia unless deprived of his 'poorterschap' for good reason. It was, however, fairly clear that the authority of the 'vroedschap' and 'burgemeesters' was on the way to being restored. Refusing assistance to them was to be punishable by loss of 'poorterschap' and a fine of £40 Hollands, as well as 'arbitrary correction according to need'. The headmen were not permitted to assemble the militia except by leave from the 'burgemeesters'.

On 25 May 1567, the Delft militia were ordered to take part in the procession of the Holy Sacrament as usual. Once again the return to normal intended by the town was overtaken by the more rigorous measures of the central government, the disarming of the militia companies, and the raising of a band of paid men under the captaincy of one of the 'vroedschap'.

Events in Amsterdam were equally important for the role of the militia in 1566-7. Amsterdam, however, was always a city apart. It was not normally in any fiscal need, nor had it suffered any decline in its prosperity, except for the short but significant interruption of the Baltic trade in 1565-6. Amsterdam was also far larger than its provincial neighbours, with a population of up to 30,000 in the 1560's. In the smaller towns, the 'vroedschap' might not include everybody of wealth, but it could include a representative of all the wealthy families. This was not so in Amsterdam which had many wealthy merchants and professional men for whom command in the militia seems to have been the highest attainable political rank. In the 1540's this was to a limited extent a stepping stone to further advancement into the 'vroedschap' but in the 1550's this seems no longer to have been the case. The militia was fairly rigidly controlled by the 'burgemeesters'. By the 1560's there was much discontent in Amsterdam with

41. The best and fullest narrative is still J. ter Gouw, Geschiedenis van Amsterdam (7 vols., Amsterdam, 1879-93) VI. See also H. van Nierop, Beeldenstorm en burgerlijk verzet in Amsterdam, 1566-7 (Nijmegen, 1978); Adriaen Pauw, 'Relaes van 't gepasseerde van Amsterdam in den jaaren 1566 en 1567' in P. C. Bor, Oorspronck, begin ende vervolgh der Nederlantscher oorlogen (6 vols.; Amsterdam, 1679-84) VI, 'Byvoegsels van authentieke stukken', not paginated in volume (References are to page and column of the 'Relaes'); Hendrik van Bieten, 'Anteykeningen gedaen van Broere Hendrik van Bieten, orateur van de minnebroeders binnen Amsterdam, op de nieuwe mare en geschiedenis dat geschiet is binnen ende omtrent Amsterdam, sedert den jare 1534 tot den jare 1567...', De Dietsche warande, VII (1866) 519-50; 'Uittreksel uit de Amsterdamsche gedenkschriften van Laurens Jacobsz Reael, 1542-67', ed. by J. C. Breen, Bijdragen en mededelingen van het historisch genootschap, XVII (1896) 1-60; 'Resolutiën der Amsterdamsche vroedschap bij den aanvang van de openbare prediking der hervormden in Amsterdam', Berigten van het historisch genootschap, IV, part. 2 (1851) 53-108.

42. The antiquities of the Amsterdam militia were described by the eighteenth century historian J. Wagenaar in a contribution published by P. Scheltema, 'Verhandelingen van de drie schutterijen... der stad Amsterdam', Oud en nieuw uit de vaderlandsche geschiedenis en letterkunde (2 vols., Amsterdam, 1844) I, 41-114.
the exclusive, and significantly more 'catholic' policy of the city 'vroedschap' and 'burgemeesters', though the accusations made by the discontented in their 'Doleantie' of 1561 are notable for the wide variety of miscellaneous complaints they contain, rather than for expressing a coherent alternative policy. There was a significant degree of continuity between the 'doleantie' movement and the events of 1566-7 in Amsterdam.

The stages of the crisis of 1566-7 in Amsterdam were much the same as elsewhere; an initial period of preaching outside the city walls, after which the reformed grew bolder and pressed their demand to be admitted to the city itself. The magistrates had not opposed the field-sermons of April 1566, but they had strengthened the watch. When, in July 1566, they received a letter from the reformed announcing the intention to preach near, but not inside, the city, the magistrates again consulted the officers and closed the gates as a precaution. So far, the attitude of the authorities to the role of the militia was the same as in Haarlem, to seek an undertaking to prevent preaching in the city; when the militia were consulted about the possibility of action against sermons in the Waterland, north of the river IJ, outside Amsterdam, they excused themselves on the ground that so many of their friends and relatives would be in the congregation, but promised to resist if the preacher tried to enter the city. The 'vroedschap'’s fears of the militia were also reflected in their plans to arm the common beer-carriers, who were under oath to the city, as an emergency watch, but these schemes were opposed by the militia.

The first actual iconoclasm took place in Amsterdam on 23 August 1566. The 'vroedschap' realised that they were threatened with isolation from the community, and saw the need for intermediaries. Unlike Delft, the 'vroedschap' of Amsterdam invited the militia to play this role. It was their initiative and not that of the reformed. Adriaen Pauw records that he and other militiamen were rather unwilling to accept the invitation to draft articles of compromise between the reformed and the magistracy.

These articles, clearly drafted after discussion with the militiamen in general, were concerned with order rather than religion. They recommended that the images should be removed to safety, the churches locked, and reformed worship allowed free and unhindered outside the city, or, in bad weather, in the church of the lepers; the sick were to be permitted to receive a 'good priest or other servant of the church', according to their conscience, but unobtrusively; no one was to

43. J. C. Breen, 'De doleantie van een deel der Amsterdamsche burgerij in 1561', Bijdragen en mededelingen van het historisch genootschap, XXIX (1903) 59-201.
44. GA Amsterdam, vroedschap-book 2, ff. 14v-5, 20; Van Bieten, 'Anteykeningen', 532-5.
45. GA Amsterdam, vroedschap-book 2, f. 25, 22 August 1566.
46. Ibidem, ff. 26v-7, 26 August 1566; Pauw, 'Relaes', 1, i-2, 11, ii-12, i.
insult another for religion's sake. All of these suggestions were accepted, at least until further word from the regent. The six 'principal heads' of the militia chosen on 27 August 1566 were not necessarily in sympathy with reformed doctrine. Indeed they could rather be described as a 'mixed committee', and even though five of them were later condemned by Alva's Council of Troubles, this was for their political rather than their ecclesiastical opinions. The six regarded themselves as 'middelaers', intermediaries, and not spokesmen for one or other cause. They were still under pressure from the reformed, however, who presented a request to be allowed to preach within the city. The 'burgemeesters' rejected this on 6 September, and urged rather that the reformed should await the decision given by the regent.

This answer, when it came, was impracticable, for it annulled the articles agreed between the 'vroedschap' and the six mediators. Though Margaret's reply was read to them, and though two commissioners of the Court of Holland arrived in Amsterdam to carry it out on 10 September 1566, the militia captains could not enforce it for fear of popular resistance. As in Delft, September 1566 was a tense month, and the events of 27-30 September were in fact a foreshadowing of those of 5-12 October in Delft. The reformed first pillaged the franciscan monastery and then demanded it for their own use. The demand was put to the six militia captains, while for their part the 'vroedschap' were under pressure from the commissioners from The Hague to reject it. They did not formally yield the franciscan chapel to the reformed, but reached a compromise with them, and also allowed them to sing their psalms at burial services.

The militia disappeared from the limelight for the next few months. Over the winter of 1566-7 Amsterdam and the other Holland towns waited for Orange's attempts to achieve a compromise solution, similar to that attempted by Catherine de Medici in her Edicts of Toleration in France. These attempts were frustrated by the regent's recovery of strength. Orange's national and unifying policy, subordinating religion to politics and separating them as issues, was on a wider scale the policy which the militia companies of the Holland towns stood for. In the early years of the revolt, 1572-6, Orange occasionally achieved his ends by using channels outside the normal magistracies, when they proved too parochial or unco-operative, by appointing town governors or even by appealing

47. Van Nierop, Beeldenstorm, 33.
49. GA Amsterdam, vroedschap-book 2, f. 29v.
51. Pauw, 'Relaes', 4, i-ii; GA Amsterdam, vroedschap-book 2, ff. 32v-6v; Ter Gouw, Geschiedenis van Amsterdam, VI, 122-3; Archives du Royaume, Brussels, papiers d'état et d'audience, 330, ff. 242v-3, Court of Holland to Margaret of Parma, 29 September 1566.
to the lower levels of society, including the militias, but in 1566 the political constellation had not altered so radically. Orange's social conservatism had not yet had to yield to the force of political necessity, and his independence was limited by the fear of dismissal. Be that as it may, Orange's policy in Amsterdam in 1566-7 had the effect of weakening the reformed, and strengthening the establishment, who were able to insist on the reformed evacuating the lepers' church, and the franciscan chapel. As far as the militia were concerned, Orange failed to defend their interests against the plan of the 'vroedschap' to raise a force of two hundred men from the unemployed. This was all-important, for if the militia could be dispensed with, there was no obstacle to reneging on all the other undertakings given to the reformed. The two hundred were actually raised in January 1567 and placed under the command of a catholic.

Orange cannot be blamed exclusively, for the militia were themselves disunited. On 16 January 1567, the president of the Court of Holland proposed a new oath to be taken by the militiamen. The response of the protestant element in the arquebusiers' company was to demand a pardon for their actions, while the catholic members denied the need for such an indemnity, and in particular rejected the idea that it should be a corporate one- they had no wish for the militia as a body to be identified with the policy of the mediators since August 1566. The refusal of the new oath provided Margaret of Parma with a pretext for the disbandment of the militia, so that Amsterdam was singled out for disarmament some months before Alva made it a general policy. The regent also proposed to allow Amsterdam to raise three hundred more paid men to keep order, or even to allow the 'vroedschap' to arm the common people in case of need. This was to admit that the relationship of 'vroedschap' and militia was hopeless, but the 'vroedschap' cannot have been completely united for news of the scheme was leaked on the same day.

The response was twofold. The reformed decided to call in Hendrik van Brederode, while those who felt that their right to bear arms in defence of their city was threatened, staged a peaceful, but armed, demonstration by going on watch, stating their intention to enforce a revised agreement reached between the city and the reformed during Orange's presence in Amsterdam. The peaceful demonstration revealed the reaction of those who upheld civic unity; Brederode, on the other hand, could only be a divisive influence. As in Leiden and Delft, the chance of a common front of reformed and militia was bound to fail, for the reformed were too small a minority and were losing ground daily.

52. Pauw, 'Relaes', 4, ii, 12, ii-16, i.
54. GA Amsterdam, vroedschap-book 2, f. 56v, 24 February 1567.
55. Pauw, 'Relaes', 5, i-ii.
Even so, though the 'burgemeesters' were able to reject the militia's demand for a mass meeting to choose deputies, to confer in all matters with the authorities, they had to accept the choice of nine men from the 'most capable and peaceable' of both religions, among the militia. Only one of the nine was a committed protestant. The 'burgemeesters' were also forced to accept Brederode as captain of a force of two hundred men raised from the citizens, fearing that refusal would provoke a riot. Brederode's month of command in Amsterdam till his withdrawal on 22 April 1567 is not well-known, but it seems to have been a very unstable balance, unacceptable to both the 'vroedschap', and the nine, who met on 4 April 1567 to discuss the raising of a new citizen watch company. At the suggestion of the 'burgemeesters', the militia leaders were willing to raise a loan to bribe Brederode to leave Amsterdam, after which the authorities recovered some power, if not much prestige.

Not all the towns of Holland suffered from unrest in 1566. Gouda, Dordrecht and Rotterdam were quiet, and able to rely on their militias. In Rotterdam the situation was contained and the 'vroedschap' rejected the suggestion of the reformed that the companies and the guilds should be called in to discuss what should be done to resist the introduction of a more powerful inquisition.

Schoonhoven in south Holland produced a surprising crop of heretics for such a small town. The militia seem to have been involved, for a heretic was accused of inciting them to stay away from a procession in which the Host was carried. There is slight evidence that the militia had been a bone of contention between two camps of the town in the 1550's, when the right to choose the headmen had been disputed between the 'vroedschap' and the 'gerecht' or judicial body.

In north Holland, Alkmaar, Enkhuizen and Hoorn were all peaceful in 1566, though they had been far from untouched by new ideas, and Alkmaar was
notable for the number of educated followers of the new doctrine. At Enkhuizen there was no iconoclasm, at Alkmaar a limited amount suppressed by the 'burgemeesters'. It was proposed to increase the number of the militia at Alkmaar by arming men under oath to the town, but his was abandoned because of resistance by the militia. In Hoorn, the 'vroedschap' reversed a decision of 1565 to raise the property qualification, thus allowing itself to increase the strength of the company.

III

In 1572, the magistracies of the Holland towns found themselves under three pressures. From above, the central government had since 1570 renewed its demands for assent to the Tenth Penny tax; from outside came the pressure of the rebel 'Beggars' after their capture of Brill on 1 April 1572, while within, the magistrates feared citizen unrest, especially if they yielded to Alva and attempted to enforce the Tenth Penny. There were connections between the internal and external pressures. Orange, though he did not establish himself in control of developments in Holland for some months after the capture of Brill, had his contact men in many of the Holland towns.

The magistrates wished to protect their independence against all these threats. The events of 1566 might have caused a reaction in favour of greater loyalty to the government, but Alva's rigorous repression had ruled out such a reconciliation. The magistrates were as unwilling to accept Alva's soldiers as they were the troops of the Beggars. The attitude of the militia was decisive in determining whether or not the Beggars would be admitted. In normal times the militia were adequate to defend a city from external assault, but 1572 was far from normal. Their disarmament in 1567 made them all the more willing to listen to the rebels' promise to restore all civic rights including that to bear arms. The

61. H. A. Enno van Gelder, 'Hervorming en hervormden te Alkmaar', Oud Holland, XL (1922) 92-123; for Enkhuizen, G. Brandt, Historie der wijdvermaerde koopstad Enkhuizen (Hoorn, 1747) 109; D. Velius, Chronyck van Hoorn (Hoorn, 1740) 275-312; S. Eikelenberg, Alkmaar en zyne geschiedenissen (Alkmaar, 1739); C. W. Bruinvis, Alkmaar en de geuzentijd (Alkmaar, 1894); ARA, handschriften, 1215, transcripts on the North Holland towns and villages in 1566-7, from the archives of the Council of Troubles.

62. GA Alkmaar, oud archief, 92, f. 118, 5 and 23 September 1566.

63. GA Hoorn, stadsarchief 49, f. 50, 23 Augustus 1566.

same concepts of civic unity were at issue in 1572 as in 1566, and indeed they were even more important, and religious issues even less decisive.\textsuperscript{65}

North Holland, relatively quiet in 1566, was vitally important in 1572. In Alkmaar and Enkhuizen, the quartering of government troops was an issue between magistrates and militia, and at Enkhuizen among the magistrates themselves. In Enkhuizen some of them were ready to admit Spaniards rather than the Beggars, but were opposed by the militia, though this does not mean that the militia were therefore ready to admit the Beggars. On 2 May 1572, they resisted a Beggar attempt to invest the town. Even so, the 'vroedschap' was evidently embarrassed. When Orange's man, Pieter Buyskens, arrived the 'vroedschap' felt obliged to call representatives of the community to its aid, four captains of militia and twelve other citizens. It also doubled the watch and decided to raise a troop of paid men, despite Buyskens' warning that the community and the militia would never accept this. The 'vroedschap' also promised to allow the citizens to choose four men, one of whom would be appointed captain, but in the event, it rejected all four nominations and picked a man of its own. Perhaps it felt safe enough in discounting the warnings of the Orangists, for Orange had after all failed in all his military enterprises so far. It was this false confidence which allowed the 'vroedschap' to attempt to play off militia against Beggars, who included some of their fellow citizens. The militia refused. On 21 May 1572, Buyskens and the Orangists staged their coup against the magistrates, who had continued to refuse sincere concessions. Though the coup was not the work of the militia, it was able to succeed because they did not oppose it.\textsuperscript{66}

Hoorn and Alkmaar waited on events at Enkhuizen before committing themselves. On 22 May 1572, the representatives of the commonalty at Hoorn confronted their 'burgemeesters', who had aroused suspicion by laying in a stock of gunpowder in the town. They forced the 'burgemeesters' to show the militia officers all letters received by the town, and on 24 May, the militia officers themselves were replaced by eight new men more acceptable to the commonalty, who with the 'vroedschap' now formed the 'Broad Council'. This was still not quite an Orangist or Beggar coup, for when one of the reformed attempted to persuade the Broad Council to allow rebels from Enkhuizen to enter Hoorn, they rejected the idea. The coup could not be long delayed, however. On 18 June

\textsuperscript{65} For a comparison of 1566 and 1572 see J. J. Woltjer's inaugural lecture, Kleine oorzaken, grote gevolgen (Leiden, 1975) 6-8; G. Parker, The Dutch Revolt (London, 1977) 131, in my view underestimates the degree of hostility to Alva's policies shown by the vroedschappen in Holland in 1571-2, as revealed, for example, in their extreme reluctance to appoint collectors of the Tenth Penny.

\textsuperscript{66} Brandt, Historie... Enkhuizen, 144-74.
1572, the Broad Council met to discuss an ultimatum from Enkhuizen, and the meeting ended in a coalition of pro-Beggar militia captains and a minority of the 'vroedschap', outvoting the rest of the 'vroedschap'. Orange's governor arrived on 19 June, took control without difficulty, and on 3 July 1572, made the militia and guilds swear an oath to Orange as Philip II's 'stadhouder'. Only a few refused. Alkmaar and the lesser towns of North Holland soon followed Enkhuizen and Hoorn into the Beggar camp, as a result of the same combination of external intimidation and internal disunity.

North Holland was separated from the south by the towns of Amsterdam and Haarlem. Amsterdam remained obstinately loyal to Philip II until 1578, but Haarlem went over to the Beggars on 8 July 1572 (two weeks after Hoorn). It is not clear whether the militia as such played any role in the changeover, but they certainly put up no resistance to it. This was the case also in some of the south Holland towns. Gouda is a case in point. When attacked by a force of fifty or sixty men under Adriaen van Swieten, the militia were divided and irresolute, but put up no resistance when one of their number opened the gates to the Beggars. Leiden folowed Gouda five days later. The Leiden militia had been rearmed in January 1572, after the 'vroedschap' had fended off the threat of a government garrison in the previous year. The 'vroedschap' was eager to defend the town against both the 'stadhouder', Bossu, and the Beggars but their pensionary, Paulus Buys, was a crypto-Orangist who opened talks with the Beggar leaders. The militia did not act against a pro-Orangist demonstration in Leiden on 23 June 1572, nor did they resist the entry of the rebels on 26 June 1572. They were rewarded later in the year by the formal restoration of all their privileges by Orange.

Dordrecht went over to the cause of the revolt at the same time as Leiden. Again, the militia were vital. On 8 April 1572, they had been largely responsible for refusing Bossu's troops access to the town, while the rebels established at Brill had sent their letters to 'the deans of the militia, the skippers and others of the craft guilds', and not to the magistrates. But the militia alone could not tip the scales. When they surrounded the Town Hall and demanded the resignation of Johan van Drenckwaert, 'schout' since 1570 and a notorious persecutor, and also the admittance of the Beggars, the tactic failed. The decisive factor was the naval blockade of Dordrecht by Bartholt Entes van Mentheda on 23-25 June 1572.

67. Velius, Chronyck van Hoorn, 332-41.
68. Willem Jansz Verwer, Memoriaelbouck 1572-81, J. J. Temminck, ed. (Haarlem, 1973) 4-6.
70. Bor, Oorspronck, VI, f. 379; GA Leiden, sec. archief, I, 386, f. 148 (15 December 1571); and 389, f. 35.
which forced the 'vroedschap' to make an agreement with the rebels. The militia and guilds are said to have been involved in the discussions for the agreement, but we have no further details. The town of Delft feilt to the revolt only in late July 1572, mainly because of the Spanish garrison at nearby Delfshaven until 21-23 July. The magistrates were neither pro-Alva or pro-Beggar, and still clearly distrusted their militia as much as in October 1566, for in April they again voted to keep order by means of paid men. On 24 July, after the withdrawal of the Spaniards from Delfshaven, the 'vroedschap' agreed to accept eighty of Lumey's men, if they swore an oath. Once inside the city, Lumey was not to be bound and on 26 July the change of magistrates was effected by intimidation.

IV

Dordrecht and Delft were typical in making agreements with the Beggars who promised to respect civic privileges and the right of catholics to worship freely. In 1572-6 all these agreements were broken, and more radical changes made. The turnover of magistrates was far greater, and there was a radicalisation in religion. At first the reformed only claimed parity. There were sporadic outbreaks of iconoclasm, foliowed by demands for the cession of churches. By the 1580's catholic worship had been forbidden, but the reformed, though powerful, were never a majority, nor even a ruling minority. There was no 'calvinist dictatorship' in the towns of Holland.

Religious change was to a certain and still debatable extent accompanied by social friction between the patrician 'vroedschappen', many of whom retained an erasmian or moderate tone, even after repeated purges, and the church councils, on which men of lesser social rank could often serve, though they were never dominated by mere artisans. This was not the only challenge to the traditional authority of the 'vroedschappen'. The appointment of governors by Orange in the towns of Holland during the years 1572-6 took away much of their autonomy if the governor was a strong personality. 'Vroedschappen' were dismissed and appointed in a more wholesale way, even their size being reduced to make them

72. GA Delft, stadsarchief, lst section, 13, part. i, f. 20 (13 April 1572); 1, part. iii, ff. 110v, 114.
more amenable\textsuperscript{74}. Occasionally, new men from outside the old patriciates were appointed, but even so, the 'vroedschappen' had a narrower power base in the ideological sense, if not in the social. They owed their power to the sword, and not always to 'traditional' authority. Try as Orange might to engage all in a national and largely secular revolt, the vision of even the newly purged 'vroedschappen' was often parochial, and it was difficult to persuade them to bear their responsibilities in the new state which was created in the 1570's.

Yet in the end they did make the transition, and proved tenacious of their power and privileges, all the more so when Orange's plans to revive government by a Council failed and the States General and provincial became the true governing bodies. This meant that the town oligarchies were the real source of power. This political development was accompanied by a return to more normal conditions in Holland in the later 1570's, as the war moved elsewhere. To that extent we can describe the decade 1572-81 as one of incipient radicalisation from which traditional authority, however, emerged unscathed and even enhanced. Can any significant militia attitude be discerned?

Even in 1566, their responses had been confused, as older concepts of civic unity were confronted by ideological loyalties which could not always be harmonised with them. In the 1570's politics in Holland were even more embittered and 'ideological', and the militia naturally more confused. Even their defensive 'raison d'être' was taken from them as it became necessary to rely on professional troops. Yet they were still felt to be indispensable, and were reinstated everywhere, though often altered in form, and usually less socially élite in character.

It is difficult to reach any conclusions on the attitudes of the militias to religious change in the 1570's, though the officers may have been chosen for their sympathy to the new religion. It is in Delft that we have the clearest evidence: the militia pressed for the expulsion of the franciscans, and also for a more stringent oath to be taken by catholic clergy\textsuperscript{75}. In Hoorn, however, the more conservative element on the 'Broad Council' were able to outvote the request of the reformed to be able to preach in July 1572, and this was in fact the beginning of a division.

\textsuperscript{74} Prosopographical studies include, J. Elias, \textit{De vroedschap van Amsterdam, 1578-1795} (2 vols.; Amsterdam 1903-5); E. Engelbrechts, \textit{De vroedschap van Rotterdam, 1572-1795} (Rotterdam, 1973); C. W. Bruinvis, \textit{De vroedschap van Alkmaar} (Alkmaar, 1898); for Delft, there is no study, but lists of office holders are in R. Boitet, \textit{Beschryving der stad Delft} (Delft, 1729) 81-4 en 93-6; I am indebted to Mr. Sterling Lamet and Mr. Chris Hibben for information on the 'vroedschappen' of Leiden and Gouda respectively. On the religious attitudes of the patricians see the article by Duke and Jones, 'Reformed Polity in Holland', n.73 and the model study of A. Th. C. Kersbergen, 'De confessionele kleur van de Rotterdamse aristocratie', \textit{Rotterdams jaarboekje}, 4th series, IX (1941) 16-40.

\textsuperscript{75} GA Delft, stadsarchief, 1st section, 13, part. i, ff. 34-6, 4 September and 18 November 1572.
between reformed and militia. Though the reformed gained, in all the towns, the rights they demanded (at Hoorn they occupied the Great Church the day after the 'burgemeesters' had refused them leave), they were as far from a common front with the militia as in 1566-7. Indeed, the calvinist church of the 1570's was more consciously 'separate' than that of the 1560's and no longer a body which could give new life to moribund ideas of civic unity, threatened also in the 1580's by the vast influx of refugees from the reconquered south.

In purely political matters there is fragmentary evidence that the militias were occasionally consulted but nothing to suggest that they ever became an institutionalised part of urban government, except in the abnormal cases of towns under siege. In Leiden the militia were prominent among the advocates of continued resistance, and in Haarlem their advice was taken by Orange's aide, Marnix, when in December 1572 he altered the 'vroedschap', suspected of being less committed to the revolt than was desirable. Ten of the leaders of the Haarlem militia were deputed to read the letters received by the besieged town, and they were also consulted before the town capitulated in July 1573. The heavy war taxation of the 1570's naturally raised the fear of popular unrest, so that 'vroedschappen' and 'burgemeesters' were reluctant to flout popular opinion, in so far as the militias might represent it. From 1576-7, they were also alarmed by the excesses committed at Ghent, Bruges and Ypres, where the much stronger southern tradition of guild turbulence had its last quasi-democratic fling before the magistrates threw in their lot with Parma in the 1580's.

Comparison of militia and 'vroedschap' membership reveals important differences between the 1560's and the 1580's, but the question of a 'cursus honorum' is a vexed one. Several militiamen reached the 'vroedschappen' in the troubled 1570's, but some of them might have expected to get there in any case, if rather later, and we have inadequate age data to claim that the 'vroedschappen' of the 1570's were younger than normal. Still, it does seem that the militias of the 1580's were no longer the traditional apprenticeship of magistrates which they had been in the 1560's, and in particular, the chances of the lower officers reaching the 'vroedschappen' were much reduced. This evidence is clearest for Leiden and Haarlem, less so for Gouda and Alkmaar, merely fragmentary for Delft.

In Amsterdam, the oligarchy which had begun to thwart the aspirations of militia officers in the 1550's, remained loyal to Philip II from 1572 to 1577. Amsterdam even hoped to remain outside the events of 1576-7, but after Don John of Austria's coup at Namur in 1577, the States of Holland were forced to

76. Velius, Chronyck van Hoorn, 341.
77. Verwer, Memoriaelbouck, 22, 90, 110-1.
take action to protect themselves against a possible attack via Amsterdam. Negotiations accompanied by a blockade of the city produced the 'satisfactie' of 8 February 1578, which granted a limited degree of freedom for the reformed in Amsterdam, dissolved the hired bands and reconstituted the old militia. It was the choice of officers for this militia which brought about the fall of the old regime in the city and its protestant reformation.\(^{78}\)

The new companies set up by the 'satisfactie', though under men who had been their leaders before or during 1566, were not fully under the control of the 'vroedschap', but were responsible to, and paid by, the States of Holland, who feared to entrust them to a still suspect body. The 'satisfactie' proved an untenable compromise, but the precise details of February to May 1578 are little known. It seems that the 'vroedschap' pressed for control of the militia, but that the States resisted, and that there was a minority on the 'vroedschap' which preferred to trust the States rather than their catholic colleagues. Negotiations failed on 26 May 1578, and the hard-line catholics were expelled from the city.\(^{79}\)

The officers of the militia constituted themselves a sort of electoral college to appoint the new 'vroedschap' and 'burgemeesters', though this was expressly stated to be without prejudice to civic privileges and was not intended to be permanent. The thirty six men appointed included at least eleven who had had a clear connection with the militia as officers, and quite possibly more could be identified if we had complete lists of the officers. It was a notable feature of the 'alteratie' of 1578 that it gave power to 'angry old men' who had been excluded for over-twenty years.

The 'alteratie' was the last significant intervention of the militia in civic politics. Ironically it was -Amsterdam which provided the States of Holland with the excuse in 1581 for the resolution which formally ended the militias' political role. The new 'vroedschap' of Amsterdam was as proudly defiant of the States, as the one it had replaced. It enjoyed, under the 'satisfactie', freedom from the obligation to repay debts contracted by the States in 1572-8, and repeatedly urged the 'satisfactie' as an excuse not to fall in with the plans of the States and Orange.\(^{80}\) Occasionally, the 'vroedschap' used the plea of consultation with the militia as a delaying tactic, for example over the closer union of the rebellious districts desired by Orange in 1581. To prevent this, the States of Holland voted on 23 March 1581 that

\(^{78}\) These years are described in detail by Ter Gouw, *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam*, VII, which ends in 1578.


\(^{80}\) The relations of Amsterdam and the States of Holland from 1578-81 are fully described in O. Coops, *De opheffing van de satisfactie van Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 1919).
J. C. GRAYSON

from now on no town shall present matters relating to the commonwealth for consideration to any persons, either the richest, militias, the gilds, or any others, as has been done by other towns at various times, but only to those who are of old entitled, unless they have the general consent of the States.

The resolution did not rule out consultation on purely local matters. Despite the prohibition, the militia companies were not without influence on the later politics of the United Provinces. Their influence was perceptible in the period of crisis from the murder of Orange to the departure of Leicester, who relied to a considerable extent on the citizen captains of Utrecht for support. In 1587, he appears to have hoped to use the militias to undermine the authority of the Holland 'vroedschappen', but in most of the towns, the letters which he addressed to the militia were intercepted by the 'vroedschap'.

The United Provinces enjoyed internal peace to a greater extent than most European states in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but there were periods of tension. In 1610-8, the religious crisis posed the question of the militia companies’ loyalty to the magistrates, who relied instead on paid men raised by virtue of a States' resolution of 1617. The year of disaster, 1672, did not enable the militia companies to resume any permanent role in politics. In the excise riots of 1747, the militia again responded in the same selective way as in 1566: they would prevent general disorder, but would not protect the tax farmers or their houses. The political turmoil of the late eighteenth century, the age of the 'Patriots' was the most serious since the birth of the Republic. The role of the militia and their claim to a say in decision making were often discussed, with many appeals to the history of the Revolt, but in reality the situation was vastly altered. The corporate attitude to political rights was yielding to a more individual concept, which had no place for the militia as a specially privileged group. The decline of the civic group portrait since the later seventeenth century may be but one example of this.

The years 1560-81 were thus exceptional. The militias were thrust into a prominence they had not sought, and confronted with decisions for which their traditional values rendered them unfitted. Their influence was vital, but negative, and after 1572, their political and social roles declined. Their old prominence was

81. W. Bisschop, *De woelingen van de Leicestersche partij binnen Leiden* (Leiden, 1867); P. Scheltema, *De graaf van Leicester te Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 1851); GA Rotterdam, landszaken, 1, Leicester to Rotterdam militia, 9 September 1587, and GA Rotterdam, algemene zaken, 18, 636, 'vroedschap’ resolution, 16 September 1587. The pensionary of Rotterdam was Johan van Oldenbarnevelt who in 1618, at his trial, explained why, in 1583, Rotterdam had been reluctant to use militiamen to prevent disorder; it would cause a 'lasting hatred' if militiamen injured their fellow citizens, whereas injuries from mere mercenaries would be sooner forgotten, 'Verhooren van Johan van Oldenbarnevelt', *Berigten van het historisch genootschap*, II, part. 2 (1849) esp. 8-9.
lost and other bodies, especially the churches, established a prior claim on the loyalties of the citizens. The cohesion of the urban community was weakened, and the path to political advancement closed to all but a very few, for the rest of the Republic’s life.
Een liberaal autocraat, gouverneur-generaal mr. J. P. graaf van Limburg Stirum (1916-1921)

E. B. LOCHER-SCHOLTEN

INLEIDING


⁴. Over de ethische politiek en de verschillende opvattingen rond dit begrip hoop ik binnenkort een artikel te publiceren.